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Eleven Things They Don’t Tell You About
Law & Economics:
An Informal Introduction to Political
Economy and Law†
Abstract
Many legal scholars have critiqued the dominant law and
economics paradigm. However, important work is all too often
neglected because it is not popularized in an accessible form. This
Article features experts who synthesize their key insights into
memorable and concise vignettes. Our 11 Things project is inspired
by the work of the Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang, who
distilled many facets of his work into a book called 23 Things They
Don’t Tell You About Capitalism. That book was a runaway success,
translated for markets around the globe, because it challenged
conventional economic reasoning with a series of short and
memorable analyses and narratives that translated academic
research into accessible language.
A project like Chang’s can also inform economic analysis of
law. We believe that law and economics pedagogy would benefit
from a shift in focus. Scholars are developing increasingly datadriven and empirical research, while too many casebooks and
teaching approaches covering the first-year U.S. law school
curriculum remain mired in toy models and simplistic accounts of
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economic life. This Article features critical insights that “they”
(politicians, bureaucrats, and, all too frequently, first-year
professors and casebook authors) tend to neglect in their
understanding of commercial life. Each piece critically explores a
facet of the theoretical foundations of law and economics. They
connect contemporary developments in policy research to classical
economic analysis of law. They bridge the gap between scholarship
and pedagogy, introducing students, practitioners, and
policymakers to political economy as a vital alternative in policy
analysis.
Introduction
Cambridge University economist Ha-Joon Chang has devoted
decades of an illustrious career to challenging orthodoxy in his field.
For example, in academic journals, he has repeatedly criticized the
manner in which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) handled
the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.1 The IMF’s approach was
focused on austerity: raising taxes and cutting government
spending.2 The results were often disastrous. Chang proposed an
alternative approach, part of a more general political economy of
regulation countering usual stories of state incapacity.3 He has also
undermined simplistic narratives of intellectual property’s role in
promoting innovation.4
Despite Chang’s rigorous work (and that of many other
economists) in standard academic articles, technocratic
policymakers have tended to ignore such messages.5 Given the
mathematization of economics, it is easy for policymakers to retreat
into formal models rather than grapple with the real-world

1. See Ha-Joon Chang, Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis, 26 WORLD DEV. 1555,
1560 (1998); Ha-Joon Chang, Institutions and Economic Development:
Theory, Policy and History, 7 J. INST. ECON. 473, 473 (2011).
2. See id.
3. See Ha-Joon Chang, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 21
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 703 (1997); Ha-Joon Chang, Breaking the Mould: An
Institutionalist Political Economy Alternative to the Neo-Liberal Theory of the Market
and the State, 26 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 539 (2002).
4. See generally Ha-Joon Chang, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development: Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 287 (2001)
(examining the desirability of the currently dominant form of intellectual property
rights regime).
5. Cf. Frank Pasquale, When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital
Deformation of U.S. Competition Policy, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST
CHRON., May 2017, at 46, 51 (critiquing technocratic antitrust policymakers for their
failure to adequately address real-world issues through their modeling).
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limitations of those models.6 Austerity-oriented managers at
international organizations like the IMF and World Trade
Organization (WTO) have another mode of deflection. They peddle
just-so stories to justify policy decisions to the public, relying on a
mix of math and narrative, modeling and common sense. In their
view, a deficit-ridden country in the midst of a currency crisis has
to tighten its belt and structurally adjust to new market realities by
abandoning many labor protections and social welfare programs.
To counter the common sense of neoliberalism, Chang sought
attention well beyond traditional academic venues. He distilled
many facets of his research into a series of clarifying concepts in his
book titled 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism.7 This
book was a runaway success, translated into many languages
around the globe, because it questioned conventional wisdom in
compelling and accessible prose.8 Companies should not be run only
in the interest of their owners, Chang insists, but rather should be
accountable to a range of stakeholders, including their workers,
local communities, and anyone affected by their externalities.9 In a
chapter entitled “The US does not have the highest living standard
in the world,” Chang denies that average (or even median) GDP
rankings settle the question of quality of life.10 The “things” Chang
alludes to in the title, patiently backed with references to empirical
work, are a bracing reminder that many examples of “received
wisdom” are not that wise after all.
Inspired by Chang, I asked attendees at a 2017 meeting of law
and political economy scholars, sponsored by the Association for the
Promotion of Political Economy and Law (APPEAL),11 to think
about what a 23 Things They Don’t Tell You project would look like
in law and economics. Ten responded, and the result is the collection
you are now reading. To fully grasp our purpose and message, it is
helpful to have an overview of the state of law and economics and
to better understand the missions of scholars and advocates who
believe that economic and political life are inextricably intertwined.
The field of law and economics has featured a strange dualism
in the past decade: increasingly data-driven and empirical research
is presented at conferences, while key policy advocates (as well as
6.
7.
(2011).
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id.
See HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT CAPITALISM
See id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 102.
See APPEAL, politicaleconomylaw.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
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some casebooks on property, torts, and contracts) present overly
schematic and ideologically biased accounts of the nature of
economic exchange.12 APPEAL seeks to right that balance,
enriching law and economics instruction by promoting more
complex and realistic perspectives on regulation, litigation, and
legislation.13
The short contributions that appear below echo Chang’s
method, encapsulating (as their titles) a sentence-length challenge
to the types of economic orthodoxy common at both the highest
levels of policymaking and the most basic levels of instruction.
Jamee Moudud frames the discussion by remarking on the
fundamental nature of law in shaping markets. Just as Chang
opened 23 Things by insisting “[t]here is no such thing as a free
market,”14 Moudud questions any project that strictly distinguishes
the political, legal, and economic spheres.
Martha T. McCluskey’s contribution, intriguingly titled “All
Costs Have a Right,” inverts the usual law and economics objection
to expansive human rights (the weary reminder to idealists, “all
rights have a cost”). Recalling the interventions of early twentiethcentury legal realists, McCluskey shows how the concept of “cost”
itself is contingent on notions of rights (e.g., to property, or against
confiscation). This transvaluation of the role of cost and money also
motivates Rohan Grey’s contribution, which explains the project of
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). MMT, in turn, supports Raúl
Carrillo’s advocacy for a jobs guarantee in the twenty-first century
to update and expand Keynesian New Deal programs like the
Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation
Corps.
Several contributors encapsulate fundamental challenges to
how value is determined in late capitalist societies. I recapitulate a
long literature on the shortcomings of public accounting to criticize
the blandly neutral valuation of arms dealing and extractive
finance in calculations of Gross Domestic Product. John Haskell
draws on Bourdieusian sociology to question the degree to which
education enhances productivity (or advances other social ends).
Reza Dibadj underlines the importance of transaction costs in
economic exchange. Lenore Palladino takes on doctrinaire
managerialism by demonstrating the dark side of financialization.
12. See JAMES KWAK, ECONOMISM: BAD ECONOMICS AND THE RISE OF
INEQUALITY (1st ed. 2017).
13. See Martha T. McCluskey, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Taub, Law and
Economics: Contemporary Approaches, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 303 n.17 (2016).
14. CHANG, supra note 7, at 1.
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It is hard to read her contribution without coming away with a
strong sense of the shortcomings of shareholder maximization as a
theory of corporate governance.
Three other essays iconoclastically advance the value of
cooperation as against competition. Sandeep Vaheesan shows how
competition, the watchword of contemporary United States
antitrust, may actually be undermining productivity and living
standards, rather than improving them. James J. Varellas takes
this perspective to an international level, defending human rights
and labor protections in trade agreements. And Jedidiah J. Kroncke
prescribes a “high road” approach to economic development,
promoting a vision of high-quality jobs encouraging more security,
spending, and investment.
The essays below are intended as provocations—ways of
shaking up received ideas about legal economic matters. But we do
not intend them as mere popularization. Like blogging or tweeting,
new forms of analysis and advocacy can fundamentally reshape a
field.15 As Tyler Cowen recently observed about economics blogs:
[O]n-line education, as a broad concept, is much further along
than many people realize . . . .I love it when people describe
writing a blog, or writing on the internet, as “popularizing”
economics or something similar. That is a sign they don’t
understand what is going on, that they don’t understand there
is such a thing as “internet economics,” and also a sign they will
not be effective competition. It’s really about “the internet way
of writing and communicating” vs. non-internet methods. The
internet methods may or may not be popular, and may or may
not be geared toward a wide audience, so they are not the same
as popularizing. One point of the internet is to find an outlet for
super-unpopular material. What’s important right now is to
develop internet methods of thinking and communicating, and
not to obsess over reaching the largest possible numbers of
people.16

We are rarely in agreement with Cowen on the particulars of
economic policy,17 but he is dead-on with respect to the need to
develop new forms of understanding in an era of rapidly changing

15. See, e.g., LEE BADGETT, THE PUBLIC PROFESSOR (2016) (explaining the
importance of dissemination to scholarly engagement, and how the communicative
imperative in turn can reshape and deepen scholarly understanding); MARK
CARRIGAN, SOCIAL MEDIA FOR ACADEMICS (James Clark et al. eds., 1st ed. 2017).
16. See Tyler Cowen, My Personal Moonshot, MERCATUS CENTER: THE BRIDGE
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/commentary/my-personal-moonshot
(emphasis in original).
17. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost-Cutting, 77
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 190 (describing some of Cowen’s statements about
inequality).
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communication. We hope that our Article can provide a quick,
shorthand, but still academically rigorous, way of challenging legal
economic orthodoxy. We welcome kindred spirits to further explore
with us a new law and economics—one that is more empirically
accurate and normatively compelling than the vision of the field
now animating many private law discussions in law school
classrooms and economic discussions among bureaucratic and
political decision-makers.
1. Corporate Financialization Hurts Jobs and Wages
Lenore Palladino
Despite energetic conversations around stagnant wages and
job creation, few consider that the financialization of the United
States’ public corporations has contributed just as much to economic
inequality as more commonly cited factors. The debate seems wellsettled: scholars point to globalization,18 skill-biased technical
change,19 and the decline of union density.20 Others point to the ‘rise
of the robots,’21 claiming that automation and technology are
driving us towards a jobless future.22
I define corporate financialization as the shift within public
companies from making money off of selling goods and services to
making a higher proportion of their profits off of financial activity
and sending those profits back to shareholders rather than
investing them in the firm or its workers. Corporate America has
shifted its behavior dramatically across industries—the ratio of
financial profits out of overall corporate profits has increased
markedly in the last few decades, and trillions have been spent by
corporations purchasing back their own stock simply to increase
their share price since such maneuvers became covered by a
regulatory safe harbor in 1982.23
18. See BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1st ed. 2016).
19. See David H. Autor et al., Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed
the Labor Market?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1169, 1169 (1998).
20. See JAKE ROSENFELD ET AL., ECON. POL. INST., UNION DECLINE LOWERS
WAGES OF NONUNION WORKERS 1 (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/1128
11.pdf.
21. See Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from
US Labor Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23285, Mar.
2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23285.
22. See LAWRENCE MISHEL & JOSH BIVENS, THE ZOMBIE ROBOT ARGUMENT
LURCHES ON 4 (Econ. Pol. Inst., 2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/126750.pdf.
23. See William Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What
Has Been Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 880–82
(2017).
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Some think that the United States’ largest businesses function
as they did in the post-World War II era: they earn profits, use those
profits in part to enrich their top CEOs, but also to invest in their
workforce, innovation, and in better prices for all of us. But
somewhere along the way, starting in the Reagan administration,
this productive cycle was broken due to government regulations and
reforms in corporate governance, and corporate America started
making more money by moving money around than they did by
selling us actual goods and services.24 The shift to shareholder
primacy—in which profits are increasingly devoted to rewarding
shareholders—was led by our industrial mainstays.
Once corporate profit-making became dependent on super-fast
computers and top executives with MBAs, investing in a stable and
productive workforce was not essential, and as a result wages and
jobs declined.25 The last few decades have seen the rise of the
fissured workplace, as firms increasingly outsource once-core
functions, making jobs increasingly precarious.26 Firms made these
choices in direct response to rising pressure from capital markets to
move money out of the firm to shareholders and keep share prices
steadily rising—choices that were sweetened by the fact that CEOs
were increasingly paid in company stock.27 “Before the 1970s,
American nonfinancial corporations consistently paid out about
50% of profits to shareholders, while retaining the rest for
investment.”28 Now, shareholder payouts may exceed 100% of
reported profits, because firms borrow in order to lift payouts even
higher.29

24. See Greta R. Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3
SOC. ECON. REV. 173, 175 (2005); WALLACE C. TURBEVILLE, FINANCIALIZATION &
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 3 (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.demos.org/publication/financiali
zation-equal-opportunity.
25. See TURBEVILLE, supra note 24, at 14.
26. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD
FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
27. See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV. Sept.
2014, at 10, https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity.
28. MIKE KONCZAL ET AL., ENDING SHORT-TERMISM: AN INVESTMENT AGENDA
FOR GROWTH (Roosevelt Inst., Nov. 6, 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015/11/Ending-Short-Termism.pdf.
29. Id. (“[O]ver the past 30 years, shareholder payouts have averaged 90 percent
of reported profits. In several years, including 2014, total payouts have actually been
greater than total profits. Almost all the increase is due to buybacks—corporations’
purchases of their own shares—which were practically nonexistent before the 1980s
but now account for nearly half of corporations’ payouts to shareholders.”); see also
J.W. MASON, DISGORGE THE CASH: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN CORPORATE
BORROWING AND INVESTMENT 14 (Roosevelt Inst., Feb. 25, 2015), http://rooseveltins
titute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Disgorge-the-Cash.pdf.
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Thus the changing nature of work—the rise of the fissured
workplace and the gig economy—is driven not just by a generic
drive for profit or the attributes of the “knowledge economy,” but a
structural shift within corporations from productive to financialized
profit-making. The relentless search for short-term profits
expresses itself through squeezing employees’ pay, transforming
employees into independent contractors to avoid paying benefits or
having responsibility for pensions, and outsourcing work to
contracting firms that compete to pay lower and lower wages.30 If
firms do not count on their employees to come up with the next big
productivity improvement or exciting product idea, because they
make their money from secondary market trading and collecting
interest payments, there is no reason to invest in employee
longevity with the firm.
One example of rising financialization has been the dramatic
increase in stock buybacks and the concurrent decrease in
productive investment—buybacks being a practice that serves no
productive purpose, but are conducted simply to boost share price.31
Pressures on firms increased with the rise of “activist investors,”
formerly known as corporate raiders.32 As institutional investors
became large shareholders of major corporations, they pressured
firms to maximize short-term profits to push up share prices.33
Since such institutional investors could move their investments
around easily, firms grew more and more responsive to capital
markets rather than to their customers.34 The rise of private equity
and the increase in leveraged buyouts has led to extractive financial
strategies in which firms cut jobs and reduce wages in order to
extract maximum wealth for the holders of equity.35 Key regulatory
and legislative changes allowed for this shift. In 1982, Congress
passed the safe-harbor provision for buybacks, which would
formerly have left companies open to charges of market
manipulation.36 Another regulatory shift allowed CEO
“performance pay” to be deducted from corporate tax and
incentivized corporations to pay CEOs in stock.37

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See WEIL, supra note 26.
See MASON, supra note 29, at 14.
See WEIL, supra note 26.
Id.
See id.
See EILEEN APPELBAUM, PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: WHEN WALL STREET
MANAGES MAIN STREET 193–200 (2014).
36. See SEC Safe Harbor Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18.
37. See id.
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Though the literature is still nascent, several scholars have
examined the direct negative impact of corporate financialization
on income inequality. One study found that financialization, net of
other factors, could account for more than half of the decline in
labor’s share of income in the nonfinancial sector of the economy,
and is comparable to the effect of de-unionization, globalization, and
technological shifts.38 Others look directly at the impact of
financialization on declining corporate investment, finding that the
financial profit rate is correlated with a significant decline in
investment, especially for large firms.39 Less investment can mean
less to spend on improving the skills and productivity of one’s
workforce.
To be sure, financialization is not the only driver of labor
market challenges, but it has become increasingly impossible to
think about how to solve problems in the labor market without
taking on corporate financialization. It is not simply that firms want
to spend less money on workers—it is that they actually need them
less and so the incentive to invest in a high-quality workforce is
much reduced. In order to have a stable and productive workforce,
the incentives that drive corporations to financialize must be
reformed.
2. All Costs Have a Right.††
Martha T. McCluskey
To solve problems of inequality and insecurity, we need to
advance universal human economic rights, not just increase
discretionary targeted redistributive spending. This is the opposite
of the conventional law and economic wisdom.
Orthodox law and economics tells us: all rights have a cost.40
Law can allocate economic gain, but not generate it. Any new
38. See Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S.
Income Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOC. 1284, 1313 (2013).
39. See Leila E. Davis, Financialization and the Non-Financial Corporation: An
Investigation of Firm-Level Investment Behavior in the United States, 69
METROECONOMICA 270, 270 (2018).
††. Thanks to Emily Villano of the LPEblog for helpful editorial suggestions on
another version of this paper, which was published as a blog post at https://lpeblog.
org/2018/04/05/economic-human-rights-not-tough-policy-tradeoffs/. A version of this
essay was also produced in 2017 as part of a short audiovideo collection. APPEAL,
Five Things They Don’t Tell You About Law and Economics (Oct. 18, 2017), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoak05emri4&feature=youtu.be.
40. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1758, 1771 (2008) (arguing that governance always requires tradeoffs, so a right
to education will come at the expense of health care or police protection); Richard A.
Epstein, Living Dangerously: A Defense of “Mortal Peril”, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 909,
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economic rights aimed at alleviating socioeconomic disadvantages
will thus require an inevitable tradeoff in public or private
spending—that new right must come at the expense of some other
economic benefit. Under this logic, a new legal right to affordable
health care would mean fewer resources are available for education
or jobs. In addition, this theory warns that an entitlement to
economic support would replace market discipline with incentives
for waste and abuse, further draining available resources.
What orthodox law and economics does not tell us: all costs
have a right. That is, any costs associated with new economic rights
arise not from essential economics, but from contingent legal and
political arrangements. Particular legal and political regimes
produce, organize, and limit access to human needs like education
or health care.41 Law itself shapes the market forces that appear to
be disrupted when law re-allocates rights to advance general
human needs.
On the question of health care, for example, a complex system
of legal rights and legal institutions already depends on government
power to advance economic gain for some at the expense of health
and economic security for others.42 Legal protections and privileges
that distribute risks and rewards in health care include patent
rights, insurance regulation, corporate governance rules, antitrust
law, criminal law, and tax policy.43
These legal rights are not firmly settled, natural, or necessary
features of impartial economics. Instead, they are continually
questioned and modified under the influence of specific contested
interests and ideologies. Powerful industries regularly engage in
extensive lobbying, litigation, and advocacy to re-design laws in
their favor.44 The United States health industry, for example, spent
half a billion dollars in 2016 on lobbying, and pharmaceutical

914–16 (arguing that a categorical right to health care based on moral resistance to
“letting people die” ignores that spending to keep one person alive could instead be
directed toward providing medical care for many poor people).
41. See e.g., International Health Care System Profiles, What Is the Role of
Government?, https://international.commonwealthfund.org/features/government_ro
le/ (describing the role of different governments in health care).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., 8 IMPORTANT REGULATIONS IN UNITED STATES HEALTH CARE, REGIS
COLLEGE, https://online.regiscollege.edu/blog/8-important-regulations-united-stat
es-health-care/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
44. Dhruv Khullar, The Unhealthy Politics of Pork: How It Increases Your
Medical Costs, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/ups
hot/the-unhealthy-politics-of-pork-how-it-increases-your-medical-costs.html
(discussing the implications of health care spending data).
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companies, hospitals, and health professionals were among the
largest contributors45 to this “market” for legal power.
New human rights to egalitarian economic support can
similarly work to re-arrange economic gain and loss as a legitimate
and beneficial function of democracy. As Sabeel Rahman explains,
basic human economic needs like health care, housing, food, and
water are often provided, produced, and governed through
intertwined public and private structures operating to create and
entrench systemic disadvantages and exclusions.46 Solutions to
inequality will only be meaningful if they go beyond redistributing
income to changing the background legal rules and governance
systems that control vital goods and services.47
We should not presume that new human economic rights are
zero sum transfers or costly distortions of optimal economic
conditions. That conventional “law and economics” thinking rests
on a simplistic assumption of an essential market order that
transcends law and politics, thereby closing off analysis of how restructuring that market could generate far better economic and
social outcomes. In contrast, the more complete and realistic
perspective of political economy recognizes that legal entitlements
do not intervene in naturally productive market activity. Instead,
legal entitlements generate and govern market production. New
legal rights can give people new power to resist existing market
constraints, and that transformative power can lead the economy to
new levels of prosperity and stability.
Like traditional property rights or the right to incorporate
businesses, economic human rights can enhance security and
liquidity by encouraging investments that improve productivity
both for those who hold the particular rights and society overall.48
The existing market operates through legal rights designed to
structure economic incentives to protect against certain forms of
market pressure. This enables firms and individuals to make
different, and potentially better, economic choices than would exist

45. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Annual Lobbying on Health, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=H&year=2016 (last visited Feb. 15,
2019); see also id.
46. K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion
Through the Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2448–51
(2018).
47. See id. at 11 (explaining that inequality is a problem of how background legal
rules operate).
48. For a discussion of the contested idea that society overall benefits from an
entitlement to incorporate, see Martha T. McCluskey, The Substantive Politics of
Formal Corporate Power, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1453, 1469–73, 1479–81 (2006).
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without those particular rights. In standard law and economics
theory, economic rights like limited liability for corporate investors
offer protection against risks of large scale coordination and
planning, so that firms and investors have opportunities for higher
gains with lower costs that may (in theory) lead to general economic
growth.49 A broad legal right to free health care similarly can
insulate people from existing costs that limit their opportunities for
productive activity likely to benefit society overall.
For example, at the microeconomic level, that protection can
create the flexibility and opportunity that encourages greater
individual achievement. If people can count on access to good health
care, insulated from the risk of losing their homes, their credit, or
their retirement savings, they are better able to think about their
financial futures. Without medical debt and costly insurance, or
without depending on an insurance-providing job or spouse,
individuals may be freer to invest in advanced education, new
business ventures, or in moving to better jobs or communities.
Businesses may be freer to compete and invest in developing high
quality products and personnel without unpredictable and
burdensome employee health care costs.
Similarly, at the macroeconomic level, encouraging societal
investment in access to health care may lead to overall economic
growth.50 Healthier and happier children, workers, and citizens are
better able to perform at school and on the job and to contribute to
the well-being of their families and communities. More generally, a
universal right to health care may produce indirect economic
benefits by supporting social and political solidarity, trust, and
confidence. A society that presses individuals and families to make
tough choices between the risk of losing life-saving health care and
the risk of financial devastation undermines those intangible
qualities. This is especially true if individuals perceive their own
choices as even tougher because the protections are reserved for a
select group of seemingly less deserving others.
Economic human rights can not only induce greater
productivity, but also reduce wasteful administrative costs and
controls involved in systems that distribute basic human needs as

49. For a discussion of the historical debate about the right to corporate limited
liability, see id. at 1481–82.
50. See, e.g., Cathy Schoen, The Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Economy, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publicat
ions/fund-reports/2016/feb/affordable-care-act-and-us-economy (last visited Feb. 13,
2019) (detailing evidence that “the [Affordable Care Act] has likely acted as an
economic stimulus.”).
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market commodities supplemented by targeted redistributive
subsidies. Health law scholar Allison Hoffman describes the current
market approach to U.S. health care as propped up by a massive
and costly regulatory structure.51 A universal individual right to
health care, in contrast, could streamline and simplify delivery of
U.S. health services. This would encourage economies of scope and
scale and equalizing bargaining power, while also giving patients
increased flexibility, freedom, and predictability to enhance their
individual control over care.
Even though human economic rights can lead to
transformative improvements in overall economic and social wellbeing, it is nonetheless true that the immediate political economic
context includes costly barriers to such beneficial transformation.
But those costly barriers are fundamentally a matter of legal and
political design and ideology, not natural or necessary economics.52
For example, in the United States, a candidate campaigning to
expand the Medicare program’s right to health care will confront
not only simplistic economic thinking, but also an electoral system
skewed by lavish campaign spending aimed at preserving the
existing unequal and destructive system of rights to profit from
scarce and costly health care. That campaign finance system is not
natural or inevitable but rather results from particular recent
judicial rulings, such as the Supreme Court’s creation of a First
Amendment right to electoral spending.53
To resist the existing structures that make broad economic
security scarce and unequal, efforts to expand substantive economic
human rights will depend on concurrent efforts to support and
improve other general and procedural rights and institutions that
uphold principles of democracy, fairness, and expansive well-being.
In the United States, for example, a broad human right to free
health care need not come at the price of federal funding for
education or jobs, if we also confront limits on democratic
government designed to enforce unequal tough tradeoffs.54 A wide
51. Allison Hoffman, Market Forces and Health Insurance, PENN LDI VIDEO
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=43lwZcwt0O8.
52. See Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the
Right’s Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1265–77 (2007) (explaining how both right and
left critiques of legal rights obscure and reify the legal rights behind the economic
and political power to make certain rights costly).
53. For a political economic analysis of this right, see generally Jedediah Purdy,
Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: Toward a Democratic First Amendment, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2161 (2019).
54. See NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE
RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA (2017) (tracing the influential
movement, based on rational choice theories, to change constitutional doctrine to

110

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 37: 1

range of legal reforms could contribute to undoing the barriers to
democratic economic rights, such as: changing monetary policy and
deficit spending rules designed to keep public capital scarce;
defending expansive Congressional spending powers55; lifting
constitutional constraints on political campaign spending; redistricting gerrymandered electoral districts; or prohibiting state
suppression of voting rights.
As long as health care is viewed as a costly and confusing
tradeoff due to natural scarcity, individuals, businesses, medical
providers, and governments will be forced into destructive
competition driven by arbitrary and risky bets on human lives. But
if there were a universal right to high quality health care,
competitive expertise and societal resources could be re-routed
toward improving health and prosperity instead. To solve problems
of inequality and insecurity, we need to advance universal human
economic rights as not only fundamental for democracy and social
justice, but also as a necessary element of a sound and successful
economy.
3. Education Is Not an Unqualified Good.
John D. Haskell
Across the contemporary social imaginary, education enjoys a
cherished mystique. It is a symbol of virtue to argue for its
expansion, for deeper investment, for embracing it as a public good.
But what I want to propose is that there are dark sides and
unintended dangers to this virtue.
To set the stage, consider just how encompassing is the modern
fidelity to education. Historically and politically, education is
viewed as a pivotal landmark in the long march from status-driven
aristocratic systems to merit-based democratic societies. Perhaps
more romantically, it is the embodiment of the Enlightenment spirit
to dispel superstition and intellectual stagnation through the light
of reason and progress. In just about any national storyline,
education never fails to show up heroically. Within the United
States, for instance, the left-wing scholar Wendy Brown celebrates
post-war education policy as “the first time in human history [that]
higher education policy and practice were oriented toward the
many, tacitly destining them for intelligent engagement with the

block democratic institutions and processes).
55. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 648 S.Ct. 1235 (2012) (invalidating
federal legislation expanding Medicaid as a violation of constitutional limits on
Congressional spending powers).
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world, rather than economic servitude or mere survival.”56
Likewise, the social welfare regimes established over the course of
the twentieth century throughout Western European states are
viewed as concrete manifestations of robust democracy, of which
education is an essential characteristic. As John Keane, a politics
professor at the University of Sydney, puts it, “social democracy [is]
defined by its distinctively radical commitment to reducing social
inequality . . . battl[ing] to empower middle-class and poor
citizens . . . with better education.”57 And it is a common trope in
state and nongovernmental bureaus engaged in all aspects of
governance to blame all kinds of human rights violations and
desperate social conditions in the formerly colonized world, at least
in part, on a lack of education which subsequently, it is argued,
should be remedied post-haste (just think of the most recent poster
child, Malala Yousafzai).58
These sentiments are repeated by leading intellectuals and
politicians irrespective of political orientation. For instance, the
year 2001 saw the administrations of President George W. Bush of
the Republican Party in the United States and Prime Minister Tony
Blair of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom roll out highprofile educational reforms, with both leaders speaking about their
reasons and ambitions. Under the tagline “education, education,
education,” Blair would tell audiences that “there is no greater
ambition for Britain than to see a steadily rising proportion gain
the huge benefits of a university education.”59 Across the Atlantic,
standing at a podium with the left-of-center senator Ted Kennedy
smiling from behind in support, Bush would begin his keynote
education speech: “There’s no greater challenge than to make sure
that every child . . . regardless of where they live, how they’re
raised, the income level of their family, every child receive a firstclass education in [the United States].”60 A consensus that

56. Leigh Claire La Berge & Quinn Slobodian, Reading for Neoliberalism,
Reading like Neoliberals, 29 AM. LITERARY HIST. 602, 607 (2017) (quoting WENDY
BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 185 (2015)).
57. John Keane, Money, Capitalism and the Slow Death of Social Democracy,
THE CONVERSATION (May 14, 2016), https://theconversation.com/money-capitalismand-the-slow-death-of-social-democracy-58703.
58. Profile: Malala Yousafzai, BBC (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/w
orld-asia-23241937.
59. Tony Blair, Address at the University of Southampton (May 23, 2017), in Full
Text of Tony Blair’s Speech on Education, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/may/23/labour.tonyblair.
60. George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
in Hamilton, Ohio, in 1 PUB. PAPERS OF GEORGE W. BUSH 2002, at 23 (Jan. 8, 2002).
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transcends political boundaries: education, education, education—
and more of it.
And yet, without necessarily dampening its credentials, there
is also disillusionment with the education system. A conservative
populism (at least within the United States), symbolized by the
election of Donald Trump, is downright fed up with governance
cultures of experts and, by extension, wary of the education system
that transforms its children into vassals of an unprincipled liberal
elite world order.61 Meanwhile, progressives and left-wing
demographics throughout the industrialized West decry the state of
higher education as a now “commodified” product in the everwidening reach of neoliberalism. To name only a few of education’s
casualties for most concerned: standardized testing, grade inflation,
increased bureaucratic auditing practices, and escalating tuition
fees and corresponding private household debt.
Whatever one’s position, it seems relatively safe to say (at least
behind closed doors) that higher education is getting worse, not
better. Especially for those with more progressive sensibilities
(conservatives already seem ready to jump ship on the public
university), the immediate reaction is to propose reforms geared
specifically toward each perceived crisis. Escalating student debt?
Make higher education free.62 Charter schools and general
outsourcing? Reinstate federal and state funding to the public
education sector.63 Increased administrative burdens on faculty and
proliferation of management personnel? Decrease the amount of
management and paperwork, and centralize authority back in the
hands of faculty.64 All of these proposals can be valuable, but it
seems to me that in championing education as an essential aspect
of a robust society, progressives have ended up overselling
education—and in doing so, inadvertently jeopardized their

61. See JAMES A. SMITH, THE IDEA BROKERS: THINK TANKS AND THE RISE OF THE
NEW POLICY ELITE (1993).
62. Shawn M. Carter, Bernie Sanders: One Thing Needs to Change in Order to
Make America ‘Great’, CNBC (Oct. 10, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/1
0/10/bernie-sanders-we-need-to-make-college-free-to-make-america-great.html.
63. Diane Ravitch, Charter Schools Damage Public Education, WASH. POST
(June 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charter-schools-are-lead
ing-to-an-unhealthy-divide-in-american-education/2018/06/22/73430df8-7016-11e8afd5-778aca903bbe_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5bf7fe05649f.
64. See, e.g., Sue Shepherd, There’s a Gulf Between Academics and University
Management—And It’s Growing, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://w
ww.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2017/jul/27/theres-a-gulf-betweenacademics-and-university-management-and-its-growing (noting that while the
academic community is worse off, the academic managers—i.e. vice-chancellors and
top administrators—are increasing in quantity and influence).
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ultimate goal of an informed, participatory, and more egalitarian
citizenry.65 In short, the very push for universal higher education
undermines the perceived goals of universal higher education.
Here are three vignettes to support this suspicion about the
promise of higher education.
A. The Black Box of Indoctrination
It really was not all that long ago ‘the left’ looked more
critically at education. The French radical intellectual Louis
Althusser, for instance, categorized the institution as part of the
ideological state apparatus, indoctrinating the young into a life of
servitude.66 What gets taught is as important as access to education,
and if learning is not only about ideas but routines, there is no
reason to think that a liberal arts education—to a significant extent
accustoming students to the vagaries of management and
paperwork—is an essential component of training generations into
a more egalitarian and less routinized world. This is not to say that
higher education is not valuable, but that it is just one of many
options in the toolkit. Too often advocates push for free, universal
education without adequately addressing the content of that
education. Education becomes a black box of progress, obfuscating
its ideological character.
B. Daycare and Diversion
There should be something disconcerting when progressives
find themselves walking in step with Blair and Bush on higher
education reform. Of course, the contrast here is usually over the
cost of education and the extent that schools and teacher survival
should be pegged to “outcomes”—but this talk colors over the fact
that what unites most advocates is the call for wider participation
in higher education, especially from traditionally excluded
communities.67 This sentiment feels right, but its origins and

65. See CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 207–48 (2014) (arguing
that the alliance of progressive social activist organizations mirrors that of the large
United States banks that provided first-time home mortgages to disadvantaged
minority demographics).
66. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES
(1970), reprinted in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127 (Ben Brewster
trans., 1971).
67. See, e.g., Isabel V. Sawhill, Higher Education and the Opportunity Gap,
BROOKINGS INST. at 1 (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/research/higher-ed
ucation-and-the-opportunity-gap/ (calling for wider participation in higher education
by lower-income children).
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outcome may be part of the very problem that the feeling seeks to
ameliorate. First, it is not by chance that the argument for
universities to increase their student numbers and diversity arises
simultaneously with the retreat of social services and opportunities
to the working class. Otherwise disaffected youth prone to rebellion
and strikes are offered the promise of the golden ticket of upward
mobility—no longer the western frontier, but the college campus.68
Here, they can be inculcated into the possibilities of a more
aesthetic and luxurious life, all the while being monitored,
surveilled, and vetted for the new governance models they will be
subject to in adulthood. Second, the push for wider participation in
higher education diverts attention from the reality that many
candidates come unprepared for university, already failed by the K–
12 system.69 Calls for higher student university numbers fragments
our energy from potentially more beneficial targeted reform at
earlier institutional stages of education, with the university again
being turned into a daycare.70 And daycares are for children, which
means discipline and supervision—not worldly creativity. If the
modernist era invested in the belief that the young would transform
the old, the postmodern era of today holds youth in a permanent
state of homeostasis: unequipped to understand what or how to
change the present, and thereby fearful of the future, prone to docile
or reactionary adulthoods.71
C. A New Tragedy of the Commons
Of course, universities can and should invest in programs for
nontraditional and less privileged students, and universities are not
a ‘limited’ resource per se (as might be suggested by the subheading
here). After all, higher education is traditionally geared toward
reproduction of the institutional conditions of the current social
order, which by its unequal character means it is only open to the
elite and certain sectors of the working class.72 But increasing
student numbers in university does not transform unequal social
relations, it further entrenches them. The prestigious jobs will
68. See David Graeber, Army of Altruists: On the Alienated Right to Do Good,
HARPER’S MAG., 31 (Jan. 2007).
69. See e.g., Sawhill, supra note 67, at 5 (arguing that the solution to increasing
success rates in higher education institutions is the improvement of the K-12
system).
70. Id.
71. See William Deresiewicz, William Deresiewicz: What Is College for? A Defense
of the Liberal Arts, YOUTUBE (May 20, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M
EEIuU6G-Ic.
72. See Sawhill, supra note 67, at 1.
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simply come to require higher degree requirements or internships
that require connections and wealth. And if social participation and
influence requires more and more certifications, it is again the
traditionally dispossessed that will bear the brunt of this educationinduced gauntlet. The elite will mobilize new forms of distinction,
and the older undergraduate university models will come
increasingly into disrepute, in need of audits and managerial
oversight, with diminishing returns for students and faculty.
An assault is unquestionably underway to transform the
public higher education system to meet systemic imperatives of
contemporary capitalist governance.73 This is often spoken of
generally under the moniker neoliberalism, but perhaps more
accurately could be described according to a set of interlocking
tendencies: overproduction and fall in the rate of profit resulting in
recourse to financialization and debt-backed wealth, a fastidious
reverence to market-based solutions doubling down on bureaucratic
processes, and breakdown in public collective trust leading to a
culture of audit, risk-obsession, and standardization.74 But to fight
this onslaught will take revised consideration of what is to be done.
A part of that struggle means letting go of this education mantra.
4. Reducing Job Security Does Not Lead to Growth.
Jedidiah J. Kroncke
Among neoclassical economists it is an article of faith that job
security protections, specifically those that deviate from at-will
employment, only hurt the workers they are meant to protect.75
This argument presumes that hiring protections raise the rate of
unemployment by increasing the relative cost of labor—much like
any regulatory intervention in labor markets.76 In a similar vein,
job tenure protections are criticized as degrading general
productivity by limiting the efficient reallocation of labor within
firms and by stultifying the churn of Schumpeterian creative

73. See STEPHEN J. BALL, GLOBAL EDUCATION INC.: NEW POLICY NETWORKS AND
THE NEO-LIBERAL IMAGINARY (2012).
74. See, e.g., ROBERT BRENNER, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE (2006).
See also MAURIZIO LAZZARATO, GOVERNING BY DEBT (Joshua David Jordan trans.,
2015); PHILIP MIROWSKI, NEVER LET A SERIOUS CRISIS GO TO WASTE: HOW
NEOLIBERALISM SURVIVED THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2013); MICHAEL POWER, THE
AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997).
75. John Pencavel, The Legal Framework for Collective Bargaining in Developing
Economies, in LABOR MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 27, 45–46 (Sebastian Edwards &
Nora C. Lustig eds., 1997).
76. Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development,
50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 49–50 (2009).
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destruction in the economy at large.77 The popularity of this
perspective was at its apex when the World Bank set interest-rate
penalties based on the strength of a country’s job tenure
protections.78 While the Bank ultimately abandoned this practice,
today’s calls for reducing employment protections, generally
couched as “labor flexibilization,” have been again cited as a
predictable “lever” to help solve the economic ills of high- and lowincome nations alike.79
As of yet, no clear policy case study shows an economy
revitalized after reducing job security protections.80 Even as recent
scholarship increasingly points to heavy endogeneity restraints on
labor market reforms, the empirical basis of these anti-employment
security claims is constructed by correlating extant labor law
regimes with levels of unemployment, and then attributing
causality to levels of job security protections.81 Most critically, these
analyses rarely, if ever, interrogate or account for the legal
mechanisms or financial expenditures that impact the translation
of these differences of formal law into practical effects.82
Not surprisingly, the empirics on the relationship between job
tenure protections and both firm productivity and general economic
growth have only grown murkier as the methods and data of labor
market economics have improved.83 The traditional rejoinder to the
neoclassic model has been that of institutional economists who

77. Id.
78. Id. at 65.
79. See Jedidiah J. Kroncke, Precariousness as Growth: Meritocracy, Human
Capital Formation, and Workplace Regulation in Brazil, China and India, 9 LAW &
DEV. REV. 321, 323 (2016).
80. Id.
81. See Salo Coslovsky et al., Resilience and Renewal: The Enforcement of Labor
Laws in Brazil, 59 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 77, 78 (2017). See also Samuel Estreicher
& Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American
Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343 (2014) (comparing how laws from various
countries protect employees from wrongful termination).
82. See Coslovsky, supra note 81, at 78. See also Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note
81 (studying whether differences in normative laws have practical effects on
protection against wrongful termination).
83. See Richard B. Freeman, Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders: The
Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance, 19 INT’L ECON. J. 129, 130
(2005). See also Nauro F. Campos & Jeffrey B. Nugent, The Dynamics of the
Regulation of Labor in Developing and Developed Countries Since 1960
(Forschungsinstitutzur Zukunft der Arbeit [IZA], Discussion Paper No. 6881, 2012)
(creating an index measuring the rigidity of employment laws in 145 countries and
finding that “changes in rigidity do not systematically affect economic growth but do
lower income inequality.”); Kim Van Eyck, Flexibilizing Employment (Int’l Lab. Off.
Small Enterprise Dev., Working Paper No. 41, 2003) (arguing that flexibilization
alone is not the key to decent work).
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argue that such protections, in fact, enhance productivity at the
firm and social level.84 They contest their neoclassical colleagues on
parallel quantitative methodological terrain, arguing that job
turnover is an inherently short-sighted business practice that
degrades the development of specific human capital and should be
regulated precisely to incentivize firms to engage in more long-term
productivity adaptations.85
Yet, both of these arguments take the citizen as laborer as the
central frame from which their analyses proceed. If we move to
consider employment as part of a continuous relationship that
individuals and social groups have with labor markets over time,
we can see more clearly not only why labor flexibilization does not
increase aggregate economic growth, but also why it invariably
leads to social breakdown and backlash.
Consider the hypothetical where an individual will know both
the prospective length of their life and the total income they will
earn therein. From this position they could plot out their
consumption perfectly, even with the usual future discounting
issues. Secondarily, an individual could predict the future returns
on any investment in human capital, specific or general. Such full
information would lead to perfectly calibrated allocations of time
toward current labor and skills training. Yet, most individuals who
derive their income from modern wage labor enjoy increasingly
little predictability about future income fluctuations.86 Moreover,
the general findings of a wide range of academic fields increasingly
validate, even at the neurological level, that future uncertainty is
the cognitive condition humans are generally least able to manage
effectively while maintaining any level of personal satisfaction.87
Even successful, high-wage earners, including the once idealized
independent contractor working in creative industries,88 often have
terrible subjective evaluations of their own well-being when facing
job insecurity.89

84. Freeman, supra note 83, at 131.
85. See id.
86. See Ulla Kinnunen et al., Job Insecurity and Self-Esteem, 35 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 617, 617–18 (2003).
87. See Lara B. Aknin et al., From Wealth to Well-Being? Money Matters, but Less
than People Think, 4 J. POSITIVE PSYCHOL. 523, 526 (2009).
88. See MYCREATIVITY READER: A CRITIQUE OF CREATIVE INDUSTRIES (Geert
Lovink & Ned Rossiter eds., 2007).
89. CAROL GRAHAM, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AN ECONOMY OF WELL-BEING
109 (2011).
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These subjective evaluations are rooted in the individual and
collective dislocations attributed to job insecurity.90 Fundamentally,
the greater the level of wage unpredictability a worker faces, the
more suboptimal their job performance and human capital
investments become.91 And, in turn, the more suboptimal their
investments in the social groups they participate in become.92 At
the same time, the financialization of the modern economy places
greater and greater expectations on citizens to adhere to debt
obligations, sanctioning those that do not conform to absolute
regularity in repayment.93
The specific list of these dislocations leading from job
insecurity is only growing. Empirical sociology has an expanding
range of studies establishing the mental health damage that job
insecurity inflicts.94 Moreover, it is not the onset of episodic job loss
that is most harmful, but operating, even when employed, under
conditions of job insecurity.95 Beyond the known destabilizing
impact of mental health on a wide-range of life outcomes, studies
have traced job insecurity to tangible physical health
degradations,96 such as rates of heart disease.97 And the further one
goes down the socio-economic ladder, the less social and

90. See Kinnunen et al., supra note 86, at 627.
91. See generally Giorgio Cutuli & Raffaele Guetto, Fixed-Term Contracts,
Economic Conjuncture, and Training Opportunities, 29 EUR. SOC. REV. 616 (2012)
(comparing permanent workers with temporary workers). See also Martin Gervais
et al., Uncertainty and the Specificity of Human Capital, 143 J. ECON. THEORY 469,
469–70 (2008) (arguing that economies with less uncertainty are more productive).
92. See Jane P. Nolan et al., Job Insecurity, Psychological Well-Being and Family
Life, in THE INSECURE WORKFORCE 181 (Edmund Heery & John Salmon eds., 2000).
93. See Esperanza Vera-Toscano et al., Building Financial Satisfaction, 77 SOC.
INDICATORS RES. 211, 226–30 (2006). See also Peter Zumbansen, The Law of Society:
Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (2007) (looking
at the role of contracts in the increasingly complex economic system).
94. See Robert A. Karasek, Jr., Job Demands, Job Decision Latitude, and Mental
Strain, 24 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 285, 291 (1979). See also Kinnunen et al., supra note 86, at
629 (“[T]here is a relationship of mutual dependence between job insecurity and selfesteem.”).
95. See Johnny Hellgren et al., A Two-Dimensional Approach to Job Insecurity,
8 EUR. J. WORK & ORG. PSYCHOL. 179, 180 (1999).
96. See ROBERT KARASEK & TÖRES THEORELL, HEALTHY WORK: STRESS,
PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WORKING LIFE (1990). See also Töres
Theorell, Working Conditions and Health, in SOC. EPIDEMIOLOGY 95 (Lisa F.
Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi eds., 2000) (showcasing the effects job insecurity has on
one’s physical health).
97. See Sarah A. Burgard et al., Perceived Job Insecurity and Worker Health in
the United States, 69 SOC. SCI. & MED. 777, 778 (2009). See also Natalie Slopen et
al., Job Strain, Job Insecurity, and Incident Cardiovascular Disease in the Women’s
Health Study, 7 PLOS ONE 1 (2012) (showing the link between job insecurity and
heart disease).

2019]

Eleven Things

119

psychological reserves workers have to cope with this stress.98 As a
result, workers become highly risk-adverse towards any form of
workplace investment,99 leading to job underperformance and poor
long-term human capital investment strategies.100 Here we can see
how even a hypothetical increase in total lifetime wages could lead
to lower levels of productivity and satisfaction when earned under
conditions of even marginally greater uncertainty.
This pattern of individual ill-effects from job insecurity is then
translated to the social level.101 Individual and systemic job
insecurity has been linked to greater drawdowns on family financial
resources,102 lower rates of marriage,103 depressed levels of home
ownership,104 and other forms of community investment. The more
longitudinal the frame of analysis becomes, the easier it is to
imagine all the social capital mechanisms which are short-circuited
not just by specific job insecurity,105 but also by the geographic
dislocation that can accompany serial job switching.
In certain high-income countries, attempts to ameliorate these
impacts have been described as regimes of “flexicurity” to ease

98. Magnus Sverke et al., No Security: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Job
Insecurity and Its Consequences, 7 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 242, 247
(2002).
99. Michiel Kompier, Job Design and Well-Being, in THE HANDBOOK OF WORK
AND HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 429, 437–38 (Marc J. Schabracq et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003).
100. See Michael Quinlan et al., The Global Expansion of Precarious Employment,
Work Disorganization, and Consequences for Occupational Health, 31 INT’L J.
HEALTH SERVS. 335 (2001) (examining the relationship between precarious
employment and occupational health and safety). See also Govert E. Bijwaard &
Justus Veenman, Unequal Chances on a Flexible Labor Market at 3–4 (Tinbergen
Inst., Discussion Paper No. 4, 2008).
101. See Nolan et al., supra note 92.
102. See Sascha O. Becker et al., Job Insecurity and Children’s Emancipation, 23
J. Population Eco. 1175, 1177 (2010) (exploring the connection between job insecurity
and higher likelihood of changing residence).
103. E.g., Daniele Vignoli et al., Uncertain Lives: Insights into the Role of Job
Precariousness on Family Formation Practices in Italy, 35 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 253,
254 (May 1, 2014) (arguing that job insecurity correlates with increased cohabitation
rates, while job security correlates with higher marriage rates).
104. E.g., Luis Diaz-Serrano, On the Negative Relationship Between Labor Income
Uncertainty and Homeownership, 14 J. HOUSING ECON. 109, 109 (2005) (“[T]he
negative relationship between labor income uncertainty and homeownership is
driven by households’ risk-aversion.”). See also Gwilym Pryce & Margaret Keoghan,
Unemployment Insurance for Mortgage Borrowers, 2 EUR. J. HOUSING POL’Y 87, 87
(2002) (“[N]either those in the riskiest categories of employment, nor those with the
least financial resources, have the highest rates of MPPI [(Mortgage Payment
Protection Insurance)] take-up.”).
105. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993) (discussing the importance of civic community
in developing successful institutions).
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specific job loss transitions.106 But even here difficulties have
emerged in the face of more precarious work,107 and such regimes
are only available to those countries that can afford them and
maintain strong social compacts.108 One notable common thread
among the recent global rise of neo-nationalist movements in even
high-income countries has been their idealization of a more
predictable and socially coherent past.109
Summarily, job insecurity, whatever hypothetical short-term
efficiencies it may allow, tears at the very social fabric on which any
economy depends. The ever-alluring promise of labor
flexibilization’s impact on aggregate growth is never realized for
this reason and, concurrently, this is why no systemic depression—
even those that proceed calls for flexibilization—has ever been
linked to job security itself. By contrast, direct social investments
in human capital have a much more robust and empirically verified
impact across the full spectrum of economic and social indicators.110
While it may seem that the productive energies of a revitalized
labor market are ever-waiting to materialize for potential
reformers, the truth is that work across the globe is becoming
precarious enough without proactive deconstructions of existing
employment law protections.111 We are already witnessing the
dislocations of this secular trend in any number of social contexts,
and the more serious question should be how to create a global legal

106. Accord Sandra Buchholz & Kathrin Kolb, Selective Flexibilization and
Deregulation of the Labour Market, in GLOBALIZED LABOUR MARKETS AND SOCIAL
INEQUALITY IN EUROPE 25 (Hans-Peter Blossfeld et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the
importance of stable and continuous employment as source of social coverage,
participation, and acceptance). E.g., Dirk Hofäcker, A Recipe for Coping with the
Challenge of Globalization? Trends in Labour Market Flexibilization and Life Course
Inequality in Denmark, in GLOBALIZED LABOUR MARKETS AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY
IN EUROPE at 149 (explaining the term “flexicurity”). Accord Rudi Wielers & Melinda
Mills, The Flexibilization of the Dutch Labour Market, in GLOBALIZED LABOUR
MARKETS AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN EUROPE 46 (2011).
107. See Luc Sels & Geert Van Hootegem, Seeking the Balance Between Flexibility
and Security, 15 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 327, 337–43 (2001).
108. See Christina Fong, Social Preferences, Self-Interest, and the Demand for
Redistribution, 82 J. PUB. ECON. 225, 239–43 (2001). See also Woojin Lee & John E.
Roemer, Racism and Redistribution in the United States, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1027,
1028–29 (2006) (arguing that racism decreases the size of the public sector).
109. See Anthony Mughan et al., Economic Globalization, Job Insecurity, and the
Populist Reaction, 22 ELECTORAL STUD. 617, 619–20 (2003).
110. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE HUMAN CAPITAL REPORT (2013).
111. See Cutuli & Guetto, supra note 91, at 617–18. See also Marcela Eslava et
al., The Effects of Regulations and Business Cycles on Temporary Contracts, the
Organization of Firms and Productivity (Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales
y Sociales [C.E.D.L.A.S.], Working Paper No. 154, 2014) (looking at the effects of
contractual flexibility on workplace efficiency).
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equilibrium that matches the organic realities of human capital
formation rather than digital velocity of financial capital.
5. Distributional Struggles Always Operate Under the
Background Laws That Determine Property, Contracts,
and Torts.
Jamee K. Moudud
This Essay provides insights from the Law and Political
Economy perspective and critiques the World Bank and neoclassical
economics more generally. At the heart of this conventional
perspective is the claim that government involvement is necessary
to deal with “market failures” and promote both business
development and social justice. I want to emphasize here that
markets are neither “perfect” nor “imperfect,” but are the outcomes
of a complex bundle of entitlements that determine the nature of
power struggles.112 I draw on the perspectives of the Legal Realists
(especially Wesley Hohfeld and Robert Hale) in my own approach.
In contrast to the mainstream Law and Economics (“L & E”)
approach, my position has three features. First, property is
fundamentally a bundle of rights and thus property ownership at
its core entails coercive power struggles between rivals and between
owners and non-owners. Second, law and power relations are
interrelated.113 These power struggles over economic outcomes
occur within the context of background laws that determine
property, contracts, and torts. Third, I pose the following question:
if the goal is to understand how legal structures shape power
struggles, then how are the laws themselves to be determined?
Here, I would argue that the policy goals that determine the laws
are themselves the consequences of political and ideational factors
as authors in the Realist and Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”)
traditions have emphasized.
I want to next focus on the question of property that lies at the
heart of the L & E framework. Drawing on a long intellectual
tradition, pioneered by the Legal Realists, I counter the standard
Robinson Crusoe-esque approach to property. In the conventional

112. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 106
(1984) (“[P]eople can struggle to improve their position vis-à-vis others by changing
the rules that define their entitlements, but that does not alter the fact that the
bundle of legal endowments they start out with positions them for the struggle, . .
.”).
113. Id. at 109 (“If the program of Realists was to lift the veil of legal Form to
reveal living essences of power and need, the program of the Critics is to lift the veil
of power and need to expose the legal elements in their composition.”).
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view, property is seen as a person’s relationship to an object (say a
piece of land or a car) based on the doctrine of first possession.114
This in rem view of property—involving your vertical relationship
to an object—is basically in Blackstone’s description of property as
a person’s “despotic dominion” over external things.115 In contrast,
Legal Realists and the CLS view—known as the progressive view of
property—conceptualized property in social and relational terms.116
The use of one’s property invariably has impacts on other people’s
property—in the Realist view, property was treated as a “bundle of
rights or entitlements” which determine the damage or costs that
use of one’s property can inflict on others within the given structure
of laws.117 Thus: “[A] property right is a relation not between an
owner and a thing, but between the owner and other individuals in
reference to things”118; it is a bundle of rights determined by the
legal framework that is in place.
Such a bundle of rights view of property automatically implies
that economic relations in capitalism are fundamentally coercive,
involving adversarial relations between rival property owners and
between property-owners and non-owners.119 Robert Lee Hale is
famously associated with the idea that the economy is a network of
coercive power relations.120
Hale’s framework drew on the
theoretical framework established by Wesley Hohfeld who in a
landmark 1913 article121 established a set of fundamental jural
relations of property holders relative to others such that, as Warren
Samuels summarized it:
there is an underlying or implicit structure of advantage and
disadvantage, of power and of exposure to power, with a
consequent structure of mutual coercive capacity depending
upon who has what right, what privilege, what power, and what
immunity and, therefore, who (else) has what duty, what no-

114. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 15 (1927)
(“The oldest and up to recently the most influential defense of private property was
based on the assumed right of the original discoverer and occupant to dispose of that
which thus became his.”).
115. Id. at 8 (describing property as “the rule over things by the individual.”).
116. See Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Hohfeld, WISC. L. REV, 975 (1982).
117. Id.
118. See Cohen, supra note 114, at 12.
119. Id. at 12–13.
120. Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases:
The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 267–68 (1973).
121. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (creating a
model of fundamental legal concepts).
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right, what liability, and what disability.122

The “free market” is thus very much a regulatory system—
because laws are by definition regulations—except that it reduces a
society’s coercive power on owners of capital.
A. Some Implications
First, distributional struggles always operate under the
background laws that determine property, contracts, and torts.
Consider, in Lochner v. New York, where the Court struck down a
New York statute that restricted the working hours of bakery
workers on the grounds that it interfered with the freely arrived at
contracts of employers and employees.123 In response to the Lochner
decision, Realists would argue that the more “deregulated” labor
relations which followed increased employers’ coercive powers over
employees. From the Realist standpoint, neoliberalism thus
increases employers’ coercive power over workers.
Second, the very notion of property in the Legal Realist
framework implies that private actions involving one’s own
property will inevitably have social consequences. This is clear from
Wesley Hohfeld’s legal taxonomy, which is bipolar: no one is an
island unto himself.124 This is why, as Warren Samuels argues,
externalities are ubiquitous in Hale’s analysis and thus: “Every
exercise of volitional freedom tends to restrict or change the
volitional freedom of others, through the coercive impact on the
alternatives open to others.”125 But if externalities are ubiquitous
then they are the inevitable outcomes of normal market behavior.
However, if “market failures” are ubiquitous then they are not
“market failures” anymore! Quite logically, therefore, there can be
no such thing as a “perfect” market, which of course implies that
there is no such thing as an “imperfect” market. In short, the Legal
Realist notion of property removes a core conceptual plank of the
global policy framework, such as those promoted by the World
Bank.
Third, the fundamentally coercive nature of property relations
implies that competition between owners is always a legalized form
of injury. In this view of property, there is no place for perfect
competition—or its opposite in neoclassical theory, some type of
imperfect competition. Incidentally, those who claim that early

122.
123.
124.
125.

Samuels, supra note 120, at 275 (emphasis in original).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See generally Hohfeld, supra note 121.
Samuels, supra note 120, at 286.
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capitalism consisted of perfect competition should note the
following. In his classic The Transformation of American Law,
1780–1860, Morton Horwitz argued that the shifts in legal thought
and policy over the course of the nineteenth century revolved
around cognizance of the fact that business development by its
nature involved injurious rivalry amongst competitors.126 As
Horwitz discusses,127 while the beneficial impacts of business
competition came to be seen as the key to industrialization, the
debates about the appropriate legal framework revolved around the
consequences of the destructive effects of cheaper and/or newer
technologies adopted by rival firms.128 Thus it came to be
recognized that “the essential attribute of property ownership was
the power to develop one’s property regardless of the injurious
consequences to others.”129 In short, “[p]ermissions to injure play
an enormously important role in economic life, since all competition
is legalized injury . . . .”130 Clearly these major debates regarding
the legal foundations of business competition would not have taken
place if perfect competition had prevailed!
It does not follow that the bundle of rights underpinning
property can be “anything.” In writing about progressive policies
(such as job programs, wage increases via strong unions, and
progressive taxes), Hale wrote that such policies raised workers’
bargaining power and increased coercive pressures on capitalists,
thereby possibly undermining the incentive to invest.131 The
following quote from Hale is significant in this regard: “A union may
have power, for instance, to force an immediate advance in wages;
yet if the wages are pushed beyond a certain limit, the impairment
of the incentive of the capitalists may before very long react
unfavorably on the laborers themselves.”132 Thus, a key challenge
that Hale was implicitly pointing to was how to organize the bundle
of rights to both provide the incentive to invest and create the
framework for social and economic rights. It must be noted that the
bundle of rights underpinning a firm, for example, determines both

126. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860 (1977).
127. Id. at 133.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 99.
130. Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD.
F. 327, 333 (1991).
131. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 603 (1943).
132. Robert L. Hale, Current Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A. J. 179, 179
(1923).
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the level and the composition of its cost. For example, the
background rules would determine the level of wages and how
“hard” employers can pump out productivity increases from workers
(given the technology). Both of these factors determine the structure
of unit labor costs and thus prices. As such, the background laws
are central to structure of prices in an economy; the latter is not a
natural phenomenon! As also emphasized by Karl Polanyi, the
market is deeply political; it is neither pre-legal nor pre-political as
in the neoclassical tradition.133
6. Entrepreneurship Can Be Unproductive or Destructive.
Frank Pasquale
In the contemporary American law school, few figures are as
lionized as the “entrepreneur.”134 Business law courses tend to offer
a narrative of wise incremental development of doctrine toward
enabling disruption, easy entry into markets, and ultra-flexible
corporate forms.135 The lawyer is ideally, in this view, a fixer
capable of profit-maximizing distributions of responsibility and
liability.136 Some even dream of automating this role via smart
contracts, to ensure even more rapid entrepreneurial activity.137
Professional responsibility courses also tend to adopt a similarly
reverential attitude toward the business client, instilling an ethic of
“zealous advocacy” in generations of students.138
This emphasis on the disruptive and new is jarring in law,
because legal systems’ internal values so often prize stability,
regularity, precedent, and tradition. Pressed to justify it, partisans
of disruptive innovation often turn to economics—a discipline all too
happy to oblige with just-so stories of creative destruction.139 As
William Baumol has observed, where economic growth has slowed,
it is often “implied that a decline in entrepreneurship was partly to
blame (perhaps because the culture’s ‘need for achievement’ has
133. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 139 (1944).
134. J. Mark Phillips, Entrepreneurial Esquires in the New Economy: Why All
Attorneys Should Learn About Entrepreneurship in Law School, 8 J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 59, 67–68 (2014).
135. Id. at 71–72.
136. Id.
137. See David Petersson, How Smart Contracts Started and Where They Are
Heading, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidpetersson/2018
/10/24/how-smart-contracts-started-and-where-they-are-heading/#796eb24137b6.
138. See Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy:
Rethinking the Attorney Advisor’s Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 254–57
(discussing the “zealous advocacy mantra” found in law schools).
139. See William Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and
Destructive, 98 J. POL. ECON. 893 (1990) (discussing the history of entrepreneurship).
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atrophied). At another time and place, it is said, the flowering of
entrepreneurship accounts for unprecedented expansion.”140 Both
policymakers and mainstream legal scholars tiptoe through the
tulips of entrepreneurship, wary of disrupting the business plans of
the disruptive innovators they admire.
However, as Baumol went on to wisely observe, there is no
obvious connection between entrepreneurship and genuine
productivity.141 Productivity, defined from a properly politicoeconomic perspective, reflects society’s ability to meet real needs
and to promote human flourishing.142 Some entrepreneurs
contribute to it, but others do not. As Baumol observes, there are
unproductive entrepreneurial activities, and “at times the
entrepreneur may even lead a parasitical existence that is actually
damaging to the economy.”143 Baumol also argues that the relative
balance of productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurs
is not dictated by technology or culture.144 “Changes in the rules
and other attendant circumstances can, of course, modify the
composition of the class of entrepreneurs,” he reminds us, insisting
on the intertwining of political and economic reality.145
Law students tend to hear little to nothing about Baumol’s
distinctions here, despite his status as one of the greatest
economists of the twentieth century. That is because the
epistemological appeal of many dominant law and economics
approaches is grounded in an ostensibly value-free and scientific
assessment of the costs and benefits of different sets of legal
rules.146 Describing certain economic activity as useless or
parasitical is a value judgment. Better instead, in the eyes of the
simplistic law and economics that animates all too much of legal
pedagogy, to stick to more quantitative assessments of monetary
value, or abstract descriptions of optimal legal rules that “neutrally”
apply trans-substantively, without respect to the nature of the
business they are affecting.
The problems with such an approach are readily apparent.
First, there are obvious instances of entrepreneurship that leave
everyone (except the entrepreneur) worse off. Trade in illicit drugs

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 894.
Id. at 915–16.
See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES x–xi (2012).
See Baumol, supra note 139, at 894. See also WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST
WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE (1991).
144. See Baumol, supra note 139, at 893.
145. Id. at 894.
146. Id.
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has devastated communities in North, Central, and South America.
In later work, Baumol described the international arms trade as
another example: rapidly cheapening implements of destruction,
and making them more readily available, is not a form of efficiency
to be celebrated without further analysis of their role in particular
conflicts.147 There may be cases where this arms trade enables a
scrappy band of rebels to overcome an oppressive tyranny. But far
more common are other dynamics: consolidation of power by
tyrannical regimes; arms races among factions within a nation, and
nations themselves; or out-of-control armaments easily snapped up
by terrorist forces.148
Similarly, in banking, all too often legislators and regulators
rush to promote “financial innovation” without fully understanding
its consequences. For example the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (via its proposed “fintech charters”) and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (via its Project Catalyst) are promoting
financial technology (fintech) firms.149 Fintech may promote
competition and create new options for consumers. But we should
ensure that it is fair competition, and that these options don’t have
hidden pitfalls. In my research on the finance and internet sectors,
I have explored patterns of regulatory arbitrage and opaque
business practices that sparked the mortgage crisis of 2008.150 I see
similar themes emerging today.
In the run-up to the crisis, federal authorities preempted state
law meant to protect consumer borrowers.151 Their stated aim was
to ensure financial inclusion and innovation, but the unintended
consequences were disastrous.152 Federal authorities were not
adequately staffed to monitor, let alone deter or punish, widespread

147. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE 55–56 (2012).
148. See id. Moreover, even innovation in information provision can reflect such
dynamics. For example, entities competing to be the top Google result on a given
search page are often tempted to engage in black hat search engine optimization to
manipulate results. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An
Essential Cultural and Political Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET (B. Szoka & A. Marcus, eds., 2010).
149. See Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency, Policy Statement on Financial
Technology Companies’ Eligibility to Apply for National Bank Charters (July 31,
2018); Genevieve Melford & Dan Quan, Project Catalyst Collaboration to Improve
Understanding of Financial Well-being, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 18,
2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/project-catalyst-collaboratio
n-improve-understanding-financial-well-being/.
150. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 5 (2015) (exposing
how powerful interests abuse secrecy for profit).
151. See JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES 223–24 (2015).
152. Id.
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fraudulent practices.153 They also flattened diverse state policies
into a one-size-fits-all, cookie-cutter approach.154 We all know the
results. Millions of families lost their homes to foreclosure, and the
economy suffered a permanent output gap that undermines our
nation’s strength to this day.155
In short: entrepreneurship and innovation are not good in
themselves. The toxic assets at the core of the financial crisis were
innovative in many ways, but ultimately posed unacceptable
risks.156 Entrepreneurial arms dealers could easily provide
massively destructive weapons to terrorists. Drug dealers
externalize the harms their products generate, while enjoying
massive profits. Many less troubling products and services have
shadow sides that outweigh their ostensible benefits.157 Until law
and economics places such concerns at the core of its inquiry—
rather than relegating them to backwater arenas of externality
correction and transfers—it will fail to account for core economic
dynamics. Law and political economy addresses these issues
directly, as an intersecting realm of monetary value and social
values.
7. Unemployment Isn’t Natural, It’s a Creature of Legal
Design.
Raúl Carrillo
Frank Pasquale recently highlighted a fundamental flaw in
standard Law & Economics thinking.158 The old paradigm holds
that mandates for higher quality jobs necessarily reduce aggregate
jobs available to workers. This crude and shallow “economism”
argues the state must either compel firms to maintain better paid,
better trained, or better cared-for workers, or allow firms to hire
more workers overall.159
Pasquale deftly dispenses with this false dichotomy. The
argument is empirically deficient: no evidence supports the
existence of the supposed trade-off.160 Furthermore, the framing is
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 222–46 (describing each link of the financial crisis).
157. Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition, and Values, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 607, 609 (2007).
158. See Frank Pasquale, There Is No Necessary Trade-Off Between Good Work
and More Work, LPE BLOG (Feb. 22, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/02/22/there-isno-necessary-trade-off-between-good-work-and-more-work/.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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conceptually unsound: as Pasquale notes, workplaces are
government creatures, so resetting permissions and prohibitions
within them is not so much state intervention, as an adjustment
with an impact dependent upon the broader system the government
controls.161
In general, standard Law and Economics fails to account for
the state’s design of the labor system. Borrowing from Neoclassical
economists, most subscribers suggest some level of unemployment
is natural: a tendency of the labor market anterior to the state.
From this perspective, workers seek to freely match with employers
and concretize their pairings via labor contracts. Although the state
may regulate the quality of these contracts, regulation tends to
reduce the total quantity of contracts and thus employment, as well
as infringing upon freedom.
Heterodox economists have argued against this vision for
decades. Noting that labor is fundamentally distinct from other
commodities, they argue there is no market for labor in the
aggregate.162 While firms hire and fire based on profit expectations,
most laborers work where they can to survive.163 Because workers
do not truly have a choice to sell their labor or not, it does not make
sense to think of a comprehensive market.164 Even if it did,
“intervention” would still be an incoherent concept. Because the
state creates and administers the “background rules” of the labor
system, which coerce people to work, the laws of the state
‘constitute’ rather than merely ‘govern’ the labor system, rendering
the idea of intervention nonsensical.165
The United States government did not invent “employment”
and “unemployment,” of course. Rather, it inherited a legal
architecture of work from the British Empire.166 Throughout the
18th century, Parliament stripped peasants of their rights to land,
compelling them to work for landowners to survive.167 As Robert Lee
Hale argued, this process of legal coercion continued in the United

161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Robert Prasch, How Is Labor Distinct from Broccoli? Some Unique
Characteristics of Labor and Their Importance for Economic Analysis and Policy, in
THE INSTITUTIONALIST TRADITION IN LABOR ECONOMICS 146–58 (Dell P. Champlin
& Janet T. Knoedler eds., 2003).
163. Id. at 148–49.
164. Id. at 148.
165. Id.
166. See generally SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2014)
(discussing the history of cotton and how it impacted modern capitalism).
167. See id.
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States.168 Over time, the U.S. government spread the wage labor
system, enclosing the lands of indigenous peoples,169 allowing
women to perform wage work for men, welcoming poor migrant
workers, and, monumentally, turning slaves into “freedmen”
without land or other capital.170 As governments legally eliminated
the material preconditions for self-sufficiency, they birthed the
modern concepts of “unemployment” and “employment.”171
In the contemporary United States, workers face a specific
challenge. We cannot work for mere biophysical resources. Rather,
we must work for money, specifically U.S. legal tender, which can
settle private debts, and must satisfy public debts to the state (most
notably, taxes). As Duncan Kennedy has noted, people may now
receive income outside of labor compensation, but broadly speaking,
even with the welfare state, people must sell their labor for
money.172 Property, contract, and tort law, along with the criminal
laws that protect and reinforce them, set the stage for a struggle for
currency. If we do not find a way to produce money on our own, we
must toil.
Leftists often argue that the “reserve army of the unemployed”
173 is a feature of the system, necessary to maintain a monetary
production economy. U.S. legal history supports this contention.
Beyond merely upholding the “background rules,” the U.S.
government has explicitly committed to a labor system that relies
on some level of involuntary unemployment.
Twice during the 20th century, progressive and radical
legislators attempted to codify an explicit commitment to true full
employment. After World War II, and again in the 1970s, Congress
considered creating a duty for the federal government to serve as
an employer of last resort, providing a job to any job seeker.174

168. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (discussing the relationship between coercion and
distribution).
169. See. e.g., Park, K-Sue, Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest of America, 41
Law & Soc. Inquiry 1006 (2016).
170. See, e.g., BECKERT, supra note 166, at 284 (explaining how “[o]ne of the first
things these ‘reconstructed’ state governments did was to try to enforce labor
discipline and keep workers on plantations.”).
171. Id.
172. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL
STUD. F. 327, 351 (1991).
173. J.W. Mason, The Fed Doesn’t Work for You, JACOBIN MAGAZINE (Jan. 6,
2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/01/federal-reserve-interest-rate-increase-j
anet-yellen-inflation-unemployment/.
174. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, The Right to Work and Earn a Living Wage: A
Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 139, 153–61 (1998).
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Although both attempts resulted in legislation that improved the
system, they failed to guarantee jobs.175 Arguably, the second effort
reified the systemic necessity of involuntary unemployment.
Although the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978
nominally commits the Federal Reserve System to strive toward full
employment as well as price stability, the life of the law has shown
that the central bank is committed to depressing wages and
prohibiting true full employment in the name of price stability.176
Despite the absence of inflation accompanying recent low
unemployment rates, Federal Reserve System officials insist tens of
millions of people, mostly people of color, must be held in idleness.177
They do this despite even right-wing criticism that a buffer stock of
unemployed people is neither an effective nor necessary means of
inflation control.178
Even the courts play a role in cementing the unjust labor
system, beyond enforcing the background rules. On two occasions,
federal courts have defended the executive branch from class action
lawsuits alleging the President failed to fulfill his part of the 1978
full employment mandate.179 Relatedly, courts have refused to
recognize a right to dignified work. Justice Thurgood Marshall once
argued “[E]very citizen who applies for a government job is entitled
to it unless the government can establish some reason for denying
the employment.”180 His associates did not agree even with this
statement.181 Constitutional law scholars have argued that
Reconstruction Amendment doctrine implicates a right to a job.182
Courts, again, have disagreed.183
175. See Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. ch. 58
(1978).
176. Mason, supra note 173. See also 15 U.S.C. § 3101.
177. See Mason, supra note 173 (describing the Fed’s policies of deliberately
raising unemployment as looking like “naked class warfare”). See also William
Darity, Jr. & Arthur H. Goldsmith, Unemployment, Social Psychology, and
Unemployment Hysteresis, 16 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 55 (1993).
178. See, e.g., John Sindreu, Everything the Market Thinks About Inflation Might
Be Wrong, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/everything-themarket-thinks-about-inflation-might-be-wrong-1488796206.
179. See Medina v. Clinton, 86 F.3d 155, 156–58 (9th Cir. 1996); Dist. 65,
Wholesale, Retail, Office & Processing Union v. Nixon, 341 F. Supp. 1193, 1197–98
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
180. Regents of St. Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1080–81 (1977).
183. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 573; Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent.
School Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1996); Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 876
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Overall, the major U.S. government organs have perpetuated
an unfair labor system rooted in false scarcity. To contest
constraints on firms as labor market interventions is to miss the
legal and economic reality. Nothing about current employment
policy is “natural” or “free.” No ironclad rules prevent us from
transforming the system, from ensuring public employment just as
we ensure public education and other programmatic rights. In a
better future, we can confidently design a Job Guarantee program
whereby we provide work for everyone who wants it.184 This
program would be no more or no less of an “intervention” than
maintaining the status quo.
8. Money Isn’t Scarce—It’s Infinite.
Rohan Grey
The founders of the Chicago School of Law & Economics set
out to improve legal decision-making by incorporating economic
‘principles’ into the law.185 From the outset, they envisaged this
interdisciplinary flow of ideas to be mostly unidirectional, on the
grounds that the discipline of ‘economics,’ defined narrowly around
contemporary neoclassical microeconomics, had far greater insights
to offer the law than vice-versa.186 However, notwithstanding Law
& Economics’ success in transforming much of contemporary
jurisprudence in its image, it remains premised on foundational
assumptions that on close inspection, are revealed to be legally
incoherent.
Perhaps the most egregious premise of contemporary
neoclassical microeconomics, and thus Law & Economics, is that of
capital scarcity. One of the first lessons economics programs impart
to their students is that “there’s no such thing as a free lunch.”187
Indeed, for many, the study of “economics” is defined entirely as the
study of the allocation of scarce resources.188 Under such a view, the
(1st Cir. 1981).
184. See, e.g., L. Randall Wray, et al., Public Service Employment: A Path to Full
Employment, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Research Project Report,
(Apr. 2018), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/rpr_4_18.pdf.
185. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to
Economic Analysis of Law, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 189 (Eric
Posner ed., 2000).
186. Id. at 194 (“Practices, institutions, bodies of law that seem wholly disparate
from the standpoint of orthodox legal analysis are seen to involve the identical
economic issue. Whole fields of law are interchangeable when viewed through the
lens of economics . . . . Economics reveals a ‘deep structure’ of law that exhibits
considerable coherence.”).
187. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 4 (6th ed. 2012).
188. See WILLIAM BOYES & MICHAEL MELVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS 19,
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baseline “equilibrium” state of the economy is one in which such
scarce resources are fully utilized, and distributional questions can
be reduced to zero-sum transfers. Social problems like
unemployment are defined as economic “imperfections,” mere
abnormalities or deviations from an otherwise optimal baseline.
The paramount question becomes: which Peter should be robbed in
order to pay Paul?189 At the same time, money—the medium via
which economic activity is primarily conducted— is treated as little
more than a veil over the value of the finite real goods and services
being transacted.
On first glance, the idea of economic scarcity seems
reasonable, especially when applied to the realm of real, physical
things like factories, humans, and the environment. However, it
falls apart when we consider property interests of economic value
that are not tangible or finite, including tradeable information,
intellectual property rights, and, perhaps most importantly, money
itself. As any corporate lawyer can attest, such forms of ‘capital’ are
legally constructed, and thus their ‘supply’ is socially determined.190
Accordingly, it makes no more sense to talk about a ‘scarcity’ of
data, copyrights, or dollars than it does to talk about a scarcity of
the human imagination.
Nevertheless, Law & Economics practitioners continue to
downplay the legal and physically unbound nature of money itself,
even as they strive to extract monetary value from ever more facets
of social life. Indeed, Richard Posner himself admitted to not having
bothered to read Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money until after the 2008 global financial crisis
because, in his view, “it was a work of macroeconomics,” and “[l]aw,
and hence the economics of law . . . did not figure largely in the
regulation of those phenomena.”191 At the same time, the rest of the
13 (5th ed. 2012) (“The study of economics begins with scarcity.”) (emphasis in
original).
189. David Schizer, Fiscal Policy in an Era of Austerity, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 453, 482 (2012) (“Politicians are less likely to accommodate one interest group
if they know this means offending another. As Michael Graetz has observed,
“[l]egislators behave[] quite differently when to pay Peter they ha[ve] to be explicit
about how they inten[d] to rob Paul.”) (alterations in original).
190. David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626, 652
(“[W]hat the critics of the neo-classical position were suggesting was . . . that
“capital” does not really exist in any determinate fashion. Rather, what exists is
legally structured access to the variety of resources that people use to produce things,
and the market value of this access cannot be determined without examining its
distribution — which is necessarily given by politics and social conditions rather
than by a purely technical process.”).
191. Richard A. Posner, How I Became a Keynesian, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 23,
2009), https://newrepublic.com/article/69601/how-i-became-keynesian.
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legal academy has also had relatively little to say about money. As
Roy Kreitner observed in 2012:
Imagine a student comes to office hours and wants to study the
legal history of contract, tort, or marriage. One barely has to
think to get her started in the right direction, and there may
even be encyclopedia articles from which to draw initial
bibliographies [ . . . ] Nothing of the sort exists for the legal
history of money—at least, not yet.192

Such chronic neglect is particularly befuddling given the
central role of financial considerations in almost every aspect of the
law and legal practice. Perhaps even more significantly, the
financial system is itself legally constructed.193 All financial
instruments, including those we consider “money,” are ultimately
tradeable legal obligations, or debts. Some are created privately
through the formation of contracts, while others are created by the
state. At the same time, different obligations have different legal
properties: debts issued by private actors are typically settled by the
tendering of the obligation of a third party (i.e. government
currency, or bank deposits), while public monetary instruments are
extinguished when the holder tenders them in order to obtain relief
from any legal liability incurred via fees, fines, and/or taxes.194
Whereas certain kinds of financial instruments such as coins
or mortgage-backed securities may only be issued by specific legally
approved entities, others, like promissory notes, can be issued by
almost anyone. At the same time, instruments issued by more
creditworthy or economically significant actors tend to have a
higher degree of “moneyness” than instruments issued by less
creditworthy or important actors.195 Consequently, most personal
IOU-like instruments are risky and rarely circulate beyond one’s
own personal networks, while government obligations such as
currency and treasury securities are considered to be the most safe
and liquid kinds of monetary instruments.196
192. Roy Kreitner, The Legal History of Money, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 415,
416 n.1 (2012).
193. See, e.g., Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2017).
194. Christine Desan, Money as a Legal Institution, in MONEY IN THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 18 (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2016).
195. Perry Merhling, The Inherent Hierarchy of Money, Prepared for Duncan
Foley Festschrift Conference (Apr. 20-21, 2012), http://ieor.columbia.edu/files/seasd
epts/industrial-engineering-operations-research/pdf-files/Mehrling_P_FESeminar_
Sp12-02.pdf. (describing how fluctuations in quality, or “moneyness,” occur for
various types of credits).
196. This is true especially with respect to floating, non-convertible, government
liabilities. See, e.g., Stephanie Bell, The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money,
25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 149 (2001); Merhling, supra note 195.
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This vision of a hierarchy of monies, of varying qualities, with
public liabilities at the top of the hierarchy, reflects the great
economist Hyman Minsky’s famous dictum: anyone can create
money, the challenge is to get it accepted.197 Or, as Alfred MitchellInnes observed over a century ago, money’s origins lie not in the
unique physical properties of gold, or any other commodity, but in
large, socially-managed credit networks.198 The great invisible
financial scoreboard-in-the-sky keeps track of everyone’s balance
sheet positions, with credits and debits coming in and out of
existence as new relationships are formed, and old ones
extinguished. In such a world, there is no inherent scarcity of
purchasing power. Rather, limits on the growth of financial activity
are determined by the availability of borrowing opportunities, the
perceived profitability of investments, and/or the degree of
acceptance of different types of financial instruments.199 In other
words, in advanced economies with sophisticated legal and financial
systems, monetary and financial capital is not scarce, but abundant.
The notion of ‘capital abundance’ has profound implications for
how lawyers, economists, and policymakers view the economy. For
example, it is commonplace among Law & Economics scholars to
assert that governments require taxation or borrowing (paid with
future taxes) in order to fund their ongoing fiscal spending
commitments. Contrary to this view, however, governments in fact
have access to a range of instruments they can and do issue to
finance new spending ex nihilo, ranging from coins and physical
notes, to treasury and central bank notes and securities. The fact
that such instruments must definitionally be first spent into
circulation before they can be taxed back out subverts the commonly
held view that taxes are necessary to provide revenue for
government spending. Indeed, as Federal Reserve Bank of New
York President Beardsley Ruml observed in a speech to the
American Bar Association in 1946:
The necessity for a government to tax in order to maintain both
its independence and its solvency is true for state and local
governments, but it is not true for a national
government . . . .[W]hose currency, for domestic purposes, is not
197. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 69 (2008).
198. See A. Mitchell-Innes, What Is Money?, 30 BANKING L.J. 377 (1913). See also
A. Mitchell-Innes, The Credit Theory of Money, 31 BANKING L.J. 151, 154 (1914).
199. See, e.g., Marc Lavoie, A Primer on Endogenous Credit-money, in MODERN
THEORIES OF MONEY: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF MONEY IN CAPITALIST ECONOMIES
506 (Louis-Philippe Rochon & Sergio Rossi eds., 2003). See also Michael McLeay et
al., Money Creation in the Modern Economy, BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. Q1 (Mar. 14,
2014), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2014/q1/money-creationin-the-modern-economy.
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convertible into gold or any commodity. It follows that our
Federal Government has final freedom from the money market
in meeting its financial requirements . . . .[T]he inevitable
social and economic consequences of any and all taxes have now
become the prime consideration in the imposition of taxes.200

Thus, Ruml concludes, “[t]he public purpose which is served
should never be obscured in a tax program under the mask of
raising revenue.”201
Ruml’s point about taxation can be expanded to a more general
maxim: when it comes to money, the legal profession must abandon
its false naturalism.202 Money is not just a “thing,” it is a malleable
legal technology that can be made to serve varying interests and
stakeholders, depending on its design and use.
9. International Trade Does Not Have to Undermine Social
Protection.
James J. Varellas III
In recent years, international trade negotiations have been at
the forefront of public policy and debate in a way they have not since
the collapse of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks after the
protests in Seattle in 1999.203 Most significantly, the U.S. and a
number of its key trading partners embarked on a new strategy of
negotiating, what came to be known as “Mega-regional free trade
agreements” (Mega-FTAs), after more than a decade of failed
attempts to restart talks on a new round of multilateral
negotiations at the WTO.204 The most important of these were the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed twelve-country trading
bloc with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $27.4 trillion,
comprising approximately 40% of the world economy, and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a
proposed agreement between the U.S. and the European Union, two
regions that combined would form an even larger Mega-FTA bloc
than the TPP.205
200. Beardsley Ruml, Taxes for Revenue Are Obsolete, 8 AM. AFFAIRS 35, 35–36
(1946).
201. Id. at 36.
202. See, e.g., Roy Kreitner, Toward a Political Economy of Money, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW, 7, 8-14 (Ugo Mattei & John D. Haskell
eds., 2015) (contrasting ‘naturalist’ and ‘chartalist’ approaches to understanding
money).
203. Jeffery D. Wilson, Mega-Regional Trade Deals in the Asia-Pacific: Choosing
Between the TPP and RCEP?, 45(2) J. CONTEMPORARY ASIA 345 (2015).
204. Id. at 346.
205. See Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s
Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/0
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One of the most notable aspects of these new U.S.-led MegaFTAs is that they intended to go far beyond tariff issues, such as
the need to rationalize the so-called “noodle bowl” of bilateral trade
agreements that had proliferated in the Asia-Pacific region since
the WTO,206 to reach what are often called “behind the border”
issues of domestic law and regulation. This behind-the-border
agenda of liberalization, deregulation, and marketization even
encompassed such critical concerns as health, the environment,
safety, physical security, and banking and financial regulation.207
In addition, TPP and TTIP also proposed investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) mechanisms that would enable foreign investors
to bring challenges to a state’s domestic regulations before an
international arbitration tribunal.208 As a result of the threat that
these agreements would empower multinational corporations and
foreign investors at the expense of the ability of sovereign states to
protect their citizens, civil society groups in both the U.S. and other
nations mobilized against TPP and TTIP.
This agenda for ever-deeper liberalization was more or less
consistent with the sensibilities of Washington’s elite consensus on
international trade, a consensus with strong intellectual roots in
neoclassical economics and law and economics, and most of the
initial civil society criticism and mobilization against TPP and TTIP
came from groups on the left. However, in time a new generation of
nationalist and nativist politicians on the right also began attacking
these agreements. Perhaps the most prominent among these rightpopulist critics has been Donald Trump, who made opposition to
TPP and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) a
centerpiece of his successful campaign for the presidency. While
trade politics had featured prominently in other recent presidential
elections,209 Trump was serious about his criticisms: he withdrew

1/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html. The eleven TPP signatories in addition
to the U.S. were Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.
206. See Ann Capling & John Ravenhill, Multilateralising Regionalism: What
Role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?, 24 PAC. REV. 553 (2011)
(discussing the problem of the “noodle bowl”).
207. See Vinod K. Aggarwal & Simon J. Evenett, The Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership: Limits on Negotiating Behind the Border Barriers, 19 BUS.
& POL. 549, 553–55 (2017).
208. See Andrew Reddie, Power in International Trade Politics: Is ISDS a Solution
in Search of a Problem?, 19 BUS. & POL. 738 (2017).
209. See James J. Varellas, The Constitutional Political Economy of Free Trade:
Reexamining NAFTA-Style Congressional-Executive Agreements, 49 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 717, 719 n.13 (2009) (discussing NAFTA criticisms from then-candidates
Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton during the 2008 Ohio primary campaign).
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the U.S. from the TPP on his first full workday in office210 after
giving an inauguration speech promising “[f]rom this this [sic] day
forward, it’s going to be only America first.”211
The significance of this political shift on trade is underscored
by the likelihood that the failure of TPP, which had been a
centerpiece of the Obama administration’s Asia strategy, will
enable Asian countries—perhaps through China’s own Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade initiative—to
rationalize the “noodle bowl” problem on their own with a trade bloc
not dominated by the U.S. or its preferences (including not sharing
the TPP’s “behind the border” ambitions),212 thus undermining U.S.
interests in the region.213 As Harley Shaiken has noted, Trump’s
nationalist opposition to TPP can be contrasted with the
internationalism of the opposition from progressive civil society
groups on the left, who have long focused on the details of “who wins
and who loses” in an international trade agreement and how new
trade deals can be made and existing trade deals remade to set
“rules of the game insuring that trade benefits workers, consumers,
communities, and the environment” in all countries instead of
further empowering corporations and investors.214
The experience of the 1930s provides a striking historical
precedent to the present moment on many issues, including trade,
because then the nationalist right also purported to take up the
cause of protecting society from the ravages of laissez-faire and

210. Baker, supra note 205.
211. Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address, in DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Jan. 20,
2017).
212. In fact, in early 2018, the remaining 11 TPP countries on their own continued
to press forward on a trade deal that limited many of the controversial provisions
the U.S. had been pushing, including ISDS. See Shawn Donnan, Robin Harding &
Mark Odell, Trans-Pacific Trade Deal to Go Ahead Without US, FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 23,
2018) (“To secure the deal the remaining members agreed last year to suspend many
of the most contentious rules sought by the Obama administration over years of
negotiations. Among those are tough intellectual property rules and key elements
of an investor-state dispute system that had been one of the TPP’s most contentious
features.”).
213. See Melissa K. Griffith et al., From Great Power Politics to a Strategic
Vacuum: Origins and Consequences of the TPP and TTIP, 19 BUS. & POL. 573, 588–
90 (2017). Indeed, one might see the political backlash against TPP and its ultimate
collapse at least partly as a result of an overreach in pursuit of further liberalization
at all costs by the Obama White House and the agency in charge of U.S. trade
negotiations, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. For instance, even the
U.S. Department of the Treasury had to issue public warnings against the prospect
of TTIP limiting domestic regulatory discretion over financial regulation. See
Aggarwal & Evenett, supra note 207, at 560–63.
214. Harley Shaiken, In Whose Interest? Inclusive Trade vs. Corporate
Protectionism, BERKELEY REV. LATIN AM. STUDS. 12, 13 (2016).
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international trade that prioritized the interests of industry. In his
1944 classic The Great Transformation, the political economist Karl
Polanyi argued that the political upheavals of the 1930s needed to
be understood from the perspective of the failure of the liberalutopian project of subjecting society to governance by a purportedly
self-adjusting and self-regulating market.215 By the time the last
countries abandoned the classical gold standard and the
international system of free trade collapsed in the 1930s, political
movements aiming to remake society—all of which Polanyi saw as
part of a “double movement” against market civilization—had
begun taking power around the world: the New Deal in the U.S.,
fascism in Europe, social democracy and democratic socialism
elsewhere in Europe, and Soviet state socialism all sought to limit
the ravages of the market in one way or another.216 Writing as
World War II drew to a close, Polanyi warned that the collapse of
nineteenth century liberalism’s project of a market civilization had
made clear that the only viable and sustainable alternative to
totalitarianism and fascism was a post-war society in which
markets were once more embedded within society (and thus put in
the service of human needs).217
Once the character of the new international trading order built
after World War II had become clear several decades later, scholars
such as Fred Block and John Ruggie continued the analysis where
Polanyi left off.218 As Ruggie put it, the international monetary and
trading order of the postwar decades was characterized by a “fusion
of power and legitimate social purpose” in the form of what he styled
the “embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic
nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character;
unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its
multilateralism
would
be
predicated
upon
domestic
interventionism” in service of policies such as full employment.219
215. See POLANYI, supra note 133.
216. See id. at 231–68.
217. Id. at 256–58B (arguing that “[t]he passing of market-economy can become
the beginning of an era of unprecedented freedom” if “[man] is true to his task of
creating more abundant freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or
planning will turn against him and destroy the freedom he is building by their
instrumentality.”).
218. See FRED L. BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER:
A STUDY OF UNITED STATES MONETARY POLICY FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT
(1977); John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982).
219. Ruggie, supra note 218, at 385, 393. For example, under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, “quantitative restrictions were prohibited, but were
deemed suitable measures for safeguarding the balance of payments—explicitly
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From this perspective, the neoliberal trade agreements that have
become familiar over the past 30 or so years, such as TPP, TTIP,
and NAFTA, are radical departures from the more socially
protective trading order of the initial postwar period, and the need
to return to a more balanced trading system that puts human needs
before the rights of multinational corporations and investors can
serve as an organizing principle for formulating an international
trading order, as well as a complementary and supporting
international monetary system, for a post-neoliberal age.
Looking forward from the decades of economic and political
catastrophe culminating in World War II, Polanyi argued the
individualistic conception of economic “freedom” of the classical
liberals and their economic models, for which the classical system
of “free trade” was perhaps the greatest accomplishment,
represented a false utopia because the scale of hardship it entailed
for people and their environment rendered it socially unsustainable.
As a result, the collision between the marketization of life and what
Polanyi called “the reality of society” inevitably leads to political
and social movements that seek to restore social protection, either
through the right’s “relinquishing [of] freedom and glorifi[cation of]
power” or the left’s “uphold[ing of] the claim to freedom, in spite of
[the necessity of socially organized regulation].”220 While Polanyi
did not foresee a revival of the project of market civilization, the rise
of neoliberalism beginning in the 1970s, and the accompanying
explosion in economic inequality and ecological crisis,221 appears to
point to another stark political choice between reaction and fascism
on the one hand, or a new left project of recreating “the meaning of
freedom in a complex society” by “remov[ing] all removable injustice
and unfreedom.”222 As with other domains of law and policy, the
latter project entails remaking the international trading regime so
including payments difficulties that resulted from domestic policies designed to
secure full employment.” According to Ruggie, “that multilateralism and the quest
for domestic stability were coupled and even conditioned by one another reflected the
shared legitimacy of a set of social objectives ‘as a single entity.’ Therefore, the
common tendency to view the postwar regimes as liberal regimes, but with lots of
cheating taking place on the domestic side, fails to capture the full complexity of the
embedded liberalism compromise.” Id. at 397–98.
220. POLANYI, supra note 133, at 257–58A.
221. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014);
Michael Burawoy, Facing an Unequal World, 63 CURRENT SOC. 5 (2015).
222. POLANYI, supra note 133, at 258B. See also G. John Ikenberry, The End of
the International Liberal Order?, 94 Int’l Affairs 7, 17 (2018) (“[T]he troubles today
might be seen as a ‘Polanyi crisis’—growing turmoil and instability resulting from
the rapid mobilization and spread of global capitalism, market society and complex
interdependence, all of which has overrun the political foundations that supported
its birth and early development.”).
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that it once again elevates the protection of society, human needs,
and other conditions conducive to human flourishing in the broadest
sense over maximizing corporate profits.223 Ruggie’s account of the
embedded liberalism compromise shows clearly that such a regime
can be a viable alternative to the type of right-populist demands for
protection from free trade voiced by politicians such as Trump.224
International trade does not have to undermine social protection.
10. Transaction Costs Matter.
Reza Dibadj
Neoclassical law and economics assumes that private actors,
left to their own bargaining, will achieve an optimal allocation of
resources. In the words of the indefatigable Richard Posner,
“resources tend to gravitate toward their most valuable uses if
voluntary exchange—a market—is permitted.”225 This tradition
claims its intellectual roots in a landmark article by Ronald Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost,226 where he first posits that private
parties can achieve an optimal distribution of resources regardless
of how initial entitlements are distributed.227 However, neoclassical
adherents conveniently limit their analysis to the first part of
Coase’s article, where he highlights a theoretical world of zero
transaction costs.228 In the real world, of course, transaction costs
matter and include “search and information costs, bargaining and
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs.”229
Unfortunately for such simplistic assumptions, transaction
costs matter. As just one example, consider that the modern firm
would not even exist in a world of zero transaction costs.230 After all,

223. POLANYI, supra note 133.
224. Ruggie, supra note 218, at 392.
225. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (5th ed. 1998).
226. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 837 (1960).
227. See id. at 850 (“It is always possible to modify by transactions on the market
the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market transactions
are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead to
an increase in the value of production.”).
228. See id. at 843 (“But the ultimate result (which maximises the value of
production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to
work without cost.”).
229. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148
(1979). See also Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism”,
99 YALE L.J. 611, 615 (1989) (transaction costs are “(1) get-together costs, (2) decision
and execution costs, and (3) information costs.”).
230. See, e.g., R. H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 7 (1988) (“But
perhaps the most important adaptation to the existence of transaction costs is the
emergence of the firm.”).
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if business could be transacted via the price mechanism, there
would be no need for organizations to have developed alongside
markets.231
The supervening irony in all of this is that the second part of
Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost plainly states that the
“argument has proceeded up to this point on the
assumption . . . that there were no costs involved in carrying out
market transactions. This is, of course, a very unrealistic
assumption.”232 In a later book, Coase points out quite clearly that
the “world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a
Coasian world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the
world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to
persuade economists to leave.”233 He even postulates that:
There is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental
administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in
economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely
when . . . a large number of people are involved and in which
therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market
or the firm may be high.234

What is fascinating is that Coase’s logic unwittingly leads in
the same direction as that espoused by the leading twentieth
century welfare economist, A.C. Pigou,235 whose work Coase
initially set out to refute.236 The law and economics literature
virtually ignores this point.237

231. Indeed, Coase notes that the “limit to the size of the firm is set where its costs
of organizing a transaction become equal to the cost of carrying it out through the
market.” Id. at 7.
232. Coase, supra note 226, at 850 (emphasis added).
233. COASE, supra note 230, at 174 (emphasis added).
234. Coase, supra note 226, at 852–53. See also id. (“This discussion should not be
taken to imply that an administrative allocation of resources is inevitably worse than
an allocation by means of the price mechanism. The operation of the market is not
itself costless, and, if the costs of operating the market exceeded the costs of running
the agency by a sufficiently large amount, we might be willing to acquiesce in the
malallocation of resources resulting from the agency’s lack of knowledge,
inflexibility, and exposure to political pressure.”).
235. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
236. See Coase, supra note 226, at 837.
237. Carl Dahlman and William Fischel are the rare economists who have made
a similar observation. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS
121 (1985) (“Despite my claim that there is little fundamentally separating Pigovian
from Coasian analysis, two schools of thought on this persist.”); Carl J. Dahlman,
The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 160 (1979) (“[T]he Coase analysis
implies one of two corrective measures: (i) find out if there is a feasible way to
decrease the costs of transacting between market agents through government action,
or (ii), if that is not possible, the analysis would suggest employing taxes, legislative
action, standards, prohibitions, agencies, or whatever else can be thought of that will
achieve the allocation of resources we have already decided is preferred. . . . In this
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Fortunately, in the ensuing decades an entire branch of
economics, transaction cost economics (TCE), has developed in
response to this reality.238 Most notably, recent Nobel laureate
Oliver Williamson has convincingly argued that TCE “holds that
alternative modes of governance differ in discrete structural ways.
Incentive intensity, administrative controls, and contract law
regime are the key attributes out of which private sector governance
works.”239 Yet, leaving aside for the moment the impact of TCE
within economics qua economics, transaction costs remain understudied in law & economics.240
11. Competition Can Be Socially Corrosive and Wasteful.
Sandeep Vaheesan
Competition is one of the talismanic words in law and
economics, and indeed, American life. Competition is hailed as an
unqualified good and often touted as a solution to what ails society
today. The value of competition is endorsed across most of the
ideological spectrum. Conservatives decry the lack of competition in
schools and taxi cab services.241 Progressives highlight the dearth
of competition among multinational corporations and call for a
revival of antitrust law.242
way, the Coase recommendations arrive at exactly the same policy implications that
the correct Pigou analysis does . . . .”).
238. For an overview of transaction cost economics, see Christopher S. Boerner &
Jeffery T. Macher, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical
Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1, 3 (2008) (“The basic insight of TCE
is to recognize that in a world of positive transaction costs, exchange agreements
must be governed, and that, contingent on the transactions to be organized, some
forms of governance are better than others.”); Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein,
Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 337 (1995) (“TCE tries to explain how trading partners
choose, from the set of feasible institutional alternatives, the arrangement that offers
protection for their relationship-specific investments at the lowest total cost.”).
239. Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 313 (1999).
240. As Williamson himself has observed, “‘[E]conomic approach to law’ is
characteristically deficient in microanalytic respects . . . As I have observed
elsewhere, this tradition relies heavily on the fiction of frictionless and/or invokes
transaction cost considerations selectively. However powerful and useful it is for
classroom purposes and as a check against loose public policy prescriptions, it easily
leads to extreme and untenable ‘solutions.’” Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding
for Natural Monopolies—In General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73,
74 (1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
241. E.g., Jim Geraghty, An Uber for Education, NAT. REV. (Nov. 19, 2014),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/11/uber-education-jim-geraghty/ (contending
that a competitive, free-market approach to education and improve failing schools).
242. E.g., Ryan Cooper, Why Dismantling Amazon Really Could Rescue ‘Trump
Country’, THE WEEK (Apr. 2, 2018), https://theweek.com/articles/764069/why-
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While reinvigorating competition between large corporations
would transfer power and wealth from big businesses to consumers,
workers, small businesses, and citizens,243 a general promotion of
competition would not have salutary effects. On the contrary,
competition can produce negative economic, political, and social
impacts. Competition is desirable in certain areas but undesirable
and detrimental to societal welfare in other areas. Three examples
illustrate how competition is deficient as a general social organizing
principle and should be promoted selectively, not categorically.
Some infrastructure services are natural monopolies and not
conducive to market competition. Electricity, natural gas, and
water distribution are examples of natural monopolies. Due to
economies of scale, these services are generally best provided
through a single entity rather than through multiple competing
entities. In concrete terms, building and operating a single electric
transmission line is more cost effective than building and operating
five parallel competing lines. Given these cost structures,
competition is not socially desirable and likely to lead to wasteful
duplication and higher rates for the public. At the retail level, the
success of competition in essential services requires a critical mass
of users to have the time, ability, and interest to comparison shop
across providers—a questionable proposition.244 Instead of relying
on competing providers in markets, vital infrastructure is typically
provided through a publicly-regulated or publicly-owned firm.
Past attempts at introducing competition into natural
monopoly sectors counsel skepticism going forward. So-called
“deregulatory” programs have sometimes transformed publiclyregulated monopolies into unconstrained, highly extractive, and
dangerous monopolies and oligopolies. Consider the rampant
dismantling-amazon-really-could-rescue-trump-country (arguing that addressing
market competition, and creating more competition, can reduce regional inequality).
243. See, e.g., José Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration 17-18 (NBER Working
Paper No. 24147, Dec. 2017) (arguing that increased labor concentration is
associated with lower posted wages); Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence
for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency 24 (NBER Working Paper
No. 22750, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22750 (finding that mergers and
acquisitions are associated with increased markups); Jan De Loecker & Jan
Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications 31 (NBER
Working Paper No. 23687, Aug. 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23687 (arguing
that rising market concentration contributes to declining labor power and labor
market dynamism); see also Luigi Zingales, Towards a Political Theory of the Firm,
J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 122–25 (2017) (explaining that increased market concentration
has led to increased political power of the firms).
244. See Ali Horacsu, Seyed Ali Madanizadeh & Steven L. Puller, Power to
Choose? An Analysis of Consumer Inertia in the Residential Electricity Market, 9 AM.
ECON J. 192 (2017).
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manipulation in California’s wholesale electricity market in 2000
245 and the disastrous program to inject competition into railways
in the United Kingdom.246 These examples suggest that in
infrastructure provision the imperfections of public regulation or
ownership are much more tolerable than the imperfections of
(nominal) competitive markets.
Labor markets are another area in which greater competition
can be harmful. Specifically, unchecked competition between
workers can lead to lower wages, the elimination of employment
benefits, and increased precariousness. An extreme example would
be to abolish child labor laws in the name of promoting labor market
competition. Karl Polanyi argued that treating labor as just another
“commodity” and encouraging unrestrained competition among
workers corroded the foundations of society in industrializing
England.247
Thanks to labor market restraints, a sizable fraction of the
working classes in the Western world enjoyed material abundance
and security in the postwar era. By unionizing and limiting
competition among themselves, workers built countervailing power
against employers. This was particularly true in heavy industry.
Through unionization, industrial workers boosted wages and
benefits for themselves and set labor market norms that helped
workers in non-unionized sectors as well.248
The big business-led attack on the social democratic state and
labor market institutions of the postwar period has reversed the
broad-based prosperity of the so-called thirty glorious years. Due to
the successful campaign against unions and the resulting
atomization of the labor force,249 power in labor markets has tilted
decisively in favor of employers.250 And developed nations have
promoted a “globalization” project that favors the interests of
245. See Severin Borenstein et al., Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California’s
Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1376, 1386 (2002).
246. See CHRISTIAN WOLMAR, ON THE WRONG LINE: HOW IDEOLOGY AND
INCOMPETENCE WRECKED BRITAIN’S RAILWAYS (2005).
247. See POLANYI, supra note 133, at 33–38.
248. See Frank Levy & Peter Temin, Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century
America (NBER Working Paper No. 13106, May 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w13106.pdf; Claudia Goldin & Robert Margo, The Great Compression: The Wage
Structure in the United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1, 32 (1992).
249. See Quoctrung Bui, 50 Years of Shrinking Union Membership in One Map,
NPR PLANET MONEY (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/2
3/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-union-membership-in-one-map (illustrating the
significant decline of union membership by each state from 1964 to 2012).
250. See Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise of U.S.
Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 533 (2011).
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multinational corporations251 and pits workers around the world,
especially those in manufacturing, in direct competition with each
other.252 The increase in competition between workers both
domestically and internationally has contributed to the diminished
standing of labor. Even as labor productivity has increased, median
wages in the United States have stagnated since the 1970s.253
In government, competition between political entities is likely
to yield destructive races to the bottom. For instance, cities and
states may compete against each other to attract highly mobile
corporations to set up or expand operations in their jurisdictions.254
This competition may take the form of generous tax holidays and
public subsidies. As they entice corporations to relocate and expand,
state and local governments starve themselves of resources.
Because they lack the monetary sovereignty of the federal
government and do not control the supply of currency, states and
cities that shrink their revenue bases and increase their
expenditures through these carrots to big business may face serious
budgetary constraints. They may have to cut vital public services
and collect revenue through much less equitable means, such as
draconian fines and penalties on the working class and poor.255
Competition among U.S. banking regulators was a contributor
to the global economic crisis in 2007-08. To increase their budgets
and expand their jurisdictions, regulators competed to persuade
financial institutions to charter with them. This competition took
the form of promising supervised entities more relaxed oversight of
financial speculation and consumer lending than what “rival”
regulators offered.256
The recent contest between cities and states to attract
Amazon’s second headquarters is a dramatic example of this

251. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 187–90 (2007).
252. See David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock:
Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV.
ECON. 205 (2016); Michael W.L. Elsby, Bart Hobijn & Aysegul Sahin, The Decline of
the U.S. Labor Share, 2013 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (2013).
253. See Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould & Josh Bivens, Wage Stagnation in Nine
Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST., Jan. 6, 2015, http://www.epi.org/files/2013/wage-stagnat
ion-in-nine-charts.pdf.
254. See Ruth Simon, U.S. Cities Battle Each Other for Jobs with $45 Billion in
Incentives, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2017, 10:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-scities-battle-each-other-for-jobs-with-45-billion-in-incentives-1489675343.
255. See Anne Stuhldreher, How Cash-Strapped Local Governments Target the
Poor, WASH. MONTHLY (July 11, 2017), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2017/07/11/
how-cash-strapped-local-governments-target-the-poor/.
256. See Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets
Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 156–60 (2009).
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insidious political competition. By putting out a request for
proposals for its second headquarters, Amazon fully exploited intercity and inter-state rivalry. Municipalities and states pledged to
shower Amazon with subsidies, infrastructure investments, and tax
holidays and even transfer core functions of sovereignty to the
online retail giant.257 For instance, Illinois offered to let Amazon
collect and keep fifty percent of the income taxes that employees at
the second headquarters would pay to the state.258 In exchange for
the promise of 50,000 jobs and prestige, the winner of this contest
may have deprived itself of significant tax revenues and placed
itself in a fiscal straightjacket.
Due to a dearth of competition in numerous product and labor
markets, monopolistic and oligopolistic corporations possess and
exercise the power to prosper at the expense of consumers, workers,
businesses, and citizens. The United States does need a discrete
competition—or more precisely an antimonopoly—program. Yet,
competition is not a sound social organizing principle and has major
deficiencies. In many areas, competition is likely to have perverse
effects. Injecting competition into the provision of infrastructure
and increasing competition between workers and governments can
deepen existing immiseration, inequality, and insecurity. Rather
than help us return to a comparative golden age of social democracy,
a blind promotion of competition across domains may, in actuality,
accelerate the decades-long transfer of power and wealth from the
many to the few.

257. Karen Weise & Spencer Soper, Amazon Second HQ Bid Ignites ‘Sadistic’
Frenzy Across North America, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2017-10-12/amazon-second-hq-bid-ignites-sadistic-frenzy-acrossnorth-america.
258. Bill Ruthhart & Monique Garcia, Illinois, Chicago Letter to Amazon: $2
Billion in Tax Breaks, Maybe More, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.chicagotr
ibune.com/news/local/politics/ct-met-illinois-amazon-tax-incentives-20171023-story.
html.

